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Common Ground in Non-face-to-face Communication: In Sensu Diviso or In Sensu Composito

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Abstract

Traditional definitions of common ground in terms of iterative de re attitudes do not apply to conversations where at least one conversational participant is not acquainted with the other(s). I propose and compare two potential refinements of traditional definitions based on Abelard’s distinction between generality in sensu composito and in sensu diviso.

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Funding

This research is supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO): Vidi grant 276-80-004 (Emar Maier) and Rubicon grant Let’s stop talking about Holmes (Merel Semeijn).

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  1. Institut Jean Nicod (École Normale Supérieure) 29, Rue d’Ulm, 75005, Paris, France

    Merel Semeijn

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I thank Emar Maier, two anonymous Amsterdam Colloquium reviewers, and two anonymous Journal of Philosophical Logic reviewers for valuable comments that helped improve the paper. This research is supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO): Vidi grant 276-80-004 (Emar Maier) and Rubicon grant Let’s stop talking about Holmes (Merel Semeijn).

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Semeijn, M. Common Ground in Non-face-to-face Communication: In Sensu Diviso or In Sensu Composito. J Philos Logic (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-024-09744-9

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