Abstract
Cooperation plays an important role in dynamic games related to resource management problems. To construct cooperative behavior in asymmetric (when players possess different discount factors) and multicriteria (when players have vector payoff functions) dynamic games, the standard approaches are not applicable. The paper presents methods based on bargaining schemes to determine cooperative and noncooperative equilibria in such games. Cooperative strategies and payoffs in asymmetric dynamic games are obtained via the Nash bargaining scheme, while modified bargaining schemes are applied for multicriteria dynamic games. To illustrate the presented approaches, a dynamic bioresource management problems (fish war problem) with asymmetric players and vector payoff functions is investigated.
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Funding
This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation, project no. 22-11-00051, https://rscf.ru/en/project/22-11-00051/.
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Translated by I. Ruzanova
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Mazalov, V.V., Rettieva, A.N. Application of Bargaining Schemes for Equilibrium Determination in Dynamic Games. Dokl. Math. 108 (Suppl 1), S133–S138 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562423600677
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562423600677