Abstract
As its main goal, the article advocates the rationality of the concept of equilibrium in secure strategies (EinSS) and the organic proximity of the logic of this concept to the logic underlying the classical approach to solving game-theory problems through Nash equilibrium. The article examines in detail the system of EinSS definitions through the prism of the Nash equilibrium concept. Based on this analogy, the connection between the existence of EinSS and the existence of a Nash equilibrium is established.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The article was written in accordance with long-term plans that arose in the course of work on a large paper [19], and the authors express deep gratitude to the co-author of this paper, C. d’Aspremont. The main provisions of the article were presented at the seminars “Theory of management of organizational systems” and “Expert assessments and data analysis” at the V.A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences; the authors are grateful to their supervisors D.A. Novikov and F.T. Aleskerov for the insightful discussions.
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This work was supported by ongoing institutional funding. No additional grants to carry out or direct this particular research were obtained.
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Iskakov, M.B., Iskakov, A.B. Equilibrium in Secure Strategies As a Development of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium. Dokl. Math. 108 (Suppl 1), S66–S74 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562423600744
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562423600744