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Individual Stability of Pareto Equilibrium of Threats and Counterthreats in a Coalition Differential Game without Side Payments

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Abstract

The notion of individual stability of a Pareto equilibrium of threats and counterthreats in a three-person linear-quadratic differential game without side payments is used. The corresponding equilibrium is found in explicit form.

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REFERENCES

  1. V. I. Zhukovskiy, Yu. N. Zhiteneva, and Yu. A. Bel’skikh, “Pareto equilibrium of threats and counterthreats in a differential game of three persons,” Mat. Teor. Igr Prilozh. 11 (1), 39–72 (2019).

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  2. V. I. Zhukovskiy and A. A. Chikrii, Differential Equations and Linear-Quadratic Differential Games (Yurait, Moscow, 2017) [in Russian].

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  3. V. I. Zhukovskiy and A. A. Grigor’ev, “Stability of a coalitional structure in a differential game,” in Complex Controlled Systems (RisZITLP, Moscow, 19960), pp. 94–97 [in Russian].

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Funding

This work was supported by ongoing institutional funding. No additional grants to carry out or direct this particular research were obtained.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia

    V. I. Zhukovskiy

  2. South Ural State University, Chelyabinsk, Russia

    K. N. Kudryavtsev & I. S. Stabulit

  3. Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

    L. V. Zhukovskaya

Authors
  1. V. I. Zhukovskiy
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  2. K. N. Kudryavtsev
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  3. L. V. Zhukovskaya
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  4. I. S. Stabulit
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Corresponding authors

Correspondence to V. I. Zhukovskiy, K. N. Kudryavtsev, L. V. Zhukovskaya or I. S. Stabulit.

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The authors of this work declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

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Translated by I. Ruzanova

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Zhukovskiy, V.I., Kudryavtsev, K.N., Zhukovskaya, L.V. et al. Individual Stability of Pareto Equilibrium of Threats and Counterthreats in a Coalition Differential Game without Side Payments. Dokl. Math. 108 (Suppl 1), S50–S55 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562423600781

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562423600781

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