Abstract
An attack–defense model is considered in which the defense party at each point of defense has several lines and uses a target allocation of its forces. The average damage caused by attack forces breaking through all defense points is used as a criterion for attack effectiveness. The problem of optimizing the defense force distribution over defense lines is solved, and optimal strategies of the parties in a zero-sum game are found.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewer, who significantly expanded the literature review and suggested several improvements of the manuscript.
Funding
This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project no. 19-01-00533a.
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Translated by I. Ruzanova
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Morozov, V.V. Attack against Layered Defense. Dokl. Math. 108 (Suppl 1), S128–S132 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562423600665
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562423600665