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The whistle-blower as a private enforcement tool in the EU banking sector: call for clarity

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Abstract

Following the financial crises and several scandals, the issue of whistleblowing has re-emerged for the banking and financial sector. These events led the EU to adopt provisions on whistleblowing in several EU legal acts concerning the banking sector such as in the Single Supervisory Mechanism. On October 2019, the EU adopted the Directive on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (Directive on the protection of whistle-blowers). The EU decided to offer to the Member States a new enforcement tool, inspired, probably, by the long-existing US model on the use of whistle-blowers as private enforcers. The first part of the article will analyse the relationship between private enforcement and whistleblowing under EU law. In the second part of this article, whistleblowing in the EU banking sector will be scrutinised and it will be argued that the sectoral provisions in the banking sector should be replaced by the Directive to ensure clarity for whistle-blowers.

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  1. Centre for Financial and Corporate Integrity, Coventry University, Coventry, UK

    Dimitrios Kafteranis

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Kafteranis, D. The whistle-blower as a private enforcement tool in the EU banking sector: call for clarity. J Bank Regul (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41261-024-00238-x

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