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A defence of merit transfer: Aquinas's interpretation and desert theory
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2024
Abstract
According to Joel Feinberg and most modern scholars of desert, the basis of desert must be a fact about the deserving person, and not about someone else. This widely accepted notion seems self-evident. However according to some religious traditions, such as Buddhism and Roman Catholicism, merit can be transferred from one person to another. That is, someone can deserve something based on some fact about someone else, such as the fact that someone else has carried out an action. This article examines the Catholic concept of merit transfer, first distinguishing it from other contemporary qualifications to the claim that a desert basis must be something about the deserving person. Then the article draws on Thomas Aquinas's explanation of the central role of relationship and love in merit and how it justifies merit transfer to address several objections made by modern scholars to such transfers. After addressing these objections, the article argues that literal understandings of merit transfer are preferable to metaphorical ones, and lastly some implications of merit transfer for Christian theology and the theory of desert more broadly are briefly discussed.
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