Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-x5gtn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-05T22:42:23.275Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Understanding the First Paralogism: A Friendly Disagreement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 April 2024

Patricia Kitcher
Patricia Kitcher*
Affiliation:
Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
*
Email: pk206@columbia.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

My comments focus on Proops’s treatment of the Paralogisms. I agree with many aspects of his discussion, including his views about the project of Rational Psychology and his analyses of how, exactly, the arguments of the Paralogisms are defective in form, but I disagree with his interpretation of the First Paralogism. I argue that the source of confusion that Kant diagnoses is not the grammatical distribution of ‘I’ as singular, but the fact that the I-representation is both empty and necessary for cognition.

Keywords

I-thinkRational Psychologytranscendental deduction
Type
Author Meets Critic
Information
Kantian Review , First View , pp. 1 - 10
Check for updates
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ameriks, Karl (1982/2000) Kant’s Theory of Mind. Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Bennett, Jonathan (1974) Kant’s Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Carl, Wolfgang (1989) Der Schweigende Kant: Die Entwürfe zu einer Deduktion der Kategorien. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.Google Scholar
Dyck, Corey W. (2014) Kant and Rational Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kant, Immanuel (1987) Critique of Judgment. Tr. Pluhar, Werner. Indianapolis IN: Hackett.Google Scholar
Kant, Immanuel (1996) Critique of Pure Reason: Unified Edition. Tr. Pluhar, Werner. Indianapolis IN: Hackett.Google Scholar
Kant, Immanuel (1997) Lectures on Metaphysics. Trans. and ed. Ameriks, Karl and Naragon, Steve. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sellars, Wilfrid (1970) ‘“…this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks”’. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 44, 5–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strawson, P. F. (1966) The Bounds of Sense. London: Methuen.Google Scholar
Willaschek, Marcus (2018) Kant and the Sources of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRefGoogle Scholar