Introduction

On May 22nd, 2022, a gunman killed 19 children and two teachers at a Texas elementary school in one of the deadliest school massacres in U.S. history. In July 2021, a Swedish police officer was shot dead in a suburb of Gothenburg by a person driving by in a vehicle. These extreme situations show that the police have limited time to react when a threat or a situation arises suddenly. After the tragedy in the Texas elementary school, the police were criticized because they did not act more rapidly, confront the perpetrator, and interrupt the killing of the children. Initially, the police justified their approach “not to act” and explained that the police were shot at when they tried to enter the school building (Fechter and Oxner 2022). Subsequently, the police admitted that they should have acted more rapidly to confront the perpetrator and save lives (Elamroussi et al. 2022). In the situation in Gothenburg, the police were at the scene to investigate a crime and were talking to one citizen when the threat suddenly appeared. These examples of tragical endings of police interventions indicate the importance of be aware of what is really going on, because the outcome of the decisions made can sometimes be very tragical.

One identified key success factor for how tactical decisions are made is situation awareness, which helps the police to perform secure and legally correct interventions and decisions (Andersen and Gustafsberg 2016; Andersen et al. 2015; Huhta 2023; O’Hare and Beer 2020). In extreme cases, situation awareness can make the difference between life and death. Situation awareness is the cognitive process through which individuals perceive and understand what is taking place in their environment (Endsley 1995; Endsley et al. 2003). For a police officer, aggregated stress can negatively affect their situation awareness capacity. If we can successfully increase situation awareness capacity, police officers can make sounder decisions—such as the correct use of force (to shoot or not to shoot)—in stressful situations during tactical interventions (Andersen and Gustafsberg 2016). It is necessary to better understand the complexity of tactical interventions to develop methods and techniques that could improve situation awareness. Huhta (2023) has investigated situation awareness in police practice and police work from many angles, with an aim to better understand how situation awareness is evolved and developed. However, Huhta (2023) has not studied what role applied police tactics have on situation awareness. There is limited research focusing on how police officers during tactical interventions build situation awareness for decision-making, from simple every day police tasks to high risk interventions. The hypothesis in this study posits that enhanced situation awareness leads to improved tactical decision-making. In this study, we focus on how situation is achieved during tactical interventions. The purpose of the article is to explore the relationship between police tactics and police officers’ work with situation awareness.

Tactical Methods

Research that investigates tactical methods—primarily from the US—shows that it is very difficult to claim that the tactical methods applied are the reason behind the situations where no one is hurt. For example, thousands of room entries are successful, but often the primary reason for the success is that the suspect does not choose to use lethal force (Blair and Martaindale 2013). During tactical interventions—for example, to stop a live shooting event—the times in which the police must make their decisions and react to a threat are often short. Time and distance are the key elements for police to succeed in tactical interventions (Blair and Martaindale 2013, 2017; Sandel et al. 2021), which provide police officers with a chance to be aware of what is going on. In police shootings, the police officers are generally not able to fire before the suspect (Blair et al. 2011), which further motivate that time and distance can be a life saver. Time and distance are also positive components to perceive and understand what is going on.

Situation Awareness

Situation awareness is defined as “The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley 1988). Situation awareness consists of three levels. First is Perception of elements in the current situation; second is Comprehension of the current situation; and third is Projection of future status. Situation awareness does not concern decisions and performance of an action, but decisions and performance are the natural outcomes (Endsley 1995). Endsley (1988) clearly states that decision-making is separated from situation awareness, but the relationship is not clear. According to Huhta et al. (2021), situation awareness together with decision-making are the two components that affect what level of force a police officer should use during tactical interventions. Huhta (2023, p. 14) explains the three stages in situation awareness in a police context as “The first stage is to make observations using our multiple senses (i.e., vision, smell, hearing, touch, taste, and proprioception). Based on the observations made, we form an understanding of the current situation, which is stage two. The third stage is to anticipate what might happen next based on stage two and linking it to prior experience and/or training.”

There are many examples where situation awareness is identified as a success factor for adequate decision-making in critical situations (Endsley and Kaber 1999). Situation awareness is dependent upon the complexity of the situation and a complex and stressful situation negatively affects the capacity for situation awareness and can lead to poor-quality decisions. Svensson and Wilson (2002) studied the situation awareness capacity of pilots, specifically mission complexity and mental workload. When studying how many actors contribute to building awareness of a situation, the concept of shared situational awareness has been used by Steen-Tveit and Munkvold (2021). They argue for shared mental models, which in tactical interventions could be seen as shared tactical methods and shared concepts. According to Steen-Tveit and Munkvold (2021), the shared mental model is important to communicate your individual situation awareness to other actors. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) tried to achieve a shared mental model and a set of shared concepts when they developed the guidance for how first responders should collaborate during an active shooter event (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap 2018).

Previous research on first responders’ situation awareness focused on technology that supports building situation awareness. Sensors and modern technology can provide important information for situation awareness (Evans 2003), but as Endsley (2001) states, even if we have lots of data that does not mean a lot of useful information. Another example of the application of situation awareness and information use is the use of social media to better understand a crisis or emergency (Snyder et al. 2019). First responders (police, firefighter, and emergency medical staff) build situation awareness differently. Police officers, for example, most often acquire situation awareness from behavioral observations (Sanquist et al. 2016). Technology can have negative effects on situation awareness for first responders. For example, there is a risk that artifacts that are developed distract the first responders from their main task, e.g., when they are driving to a situation after an alarm call (Sanquist et al. 2016). Sanquist et al. (2016) argue that we should “Conduct research to evaluate the impact of high workload in emergencies upon the attentional focus of responders—what do they pay attention to now, and how will additional data streams affect this?”.

Information is necessary for situation awareness. First responders need to reach the scene of the incident—often by car—and important information given from the dispatch center to the police officers in direct connection with a complex traffic situation is a challenge (Wallén Warner et al. 2022). The information distribution is especially problematic in a stressful situation. For example, studies show that the mobile vehicle-mounted terminals used by the police officers negatively affected their cognitive performance (Zahabi and Kaber 2018). In a randomized controlled experiment that incorporated a police firearms simulator, researchers found that situation awareness was negatively affected by information from the dispatch center. The police officers relied considerably on dispatched information when making the decision to discharge their service weapons when confronted with an ambiguously armed subject. Incorrect information contributed to an increase in shooting errors, although the variables in the simulated shooting situation were unchanged (Taylor 2020).

Situation awareness is also applied as a concept in crisis and emergency management where shared situation awareness is usually discussed. In the example of the terrorist attack on Utøya in Norway and how the police acted, the capacity to combine bits and pieces of information was limited and resulted in poor shared situation awareness (Bye et al. 2019). In large crises, information quality is important to establish shared situation awareness. Quality criteria could indicate what information was needed to establish shared awareness of the situation (Seppänen and Virrantaus 2015). Situation awareness is needed for individuals, for coordinating and interacting during large and extreme events. For example, in a plane crash, situation awareness is crucial (Luokkala and Virrantaus 2014). Huhta et al. (2023) identified seven themes where situation awareness is derived during police work. The themes are distance/time law, partner/roles, profiling the suspect, surrounding environment and conditions, tactical options and opportunities, ongoing assessment of own tactical activities and outcomes, and dangerous objects. Situation awareness also affects how individual police officers act during, e.g., active shooter events (Phillips 2020). For example, officers have a high risk to die during an active shooter event when they respond to a call not classified as an active shooter event (Blair and Duron 2022). There are also studies focusing on challenges for police officers to be able to engage quick and how to act to make shoot or no shoot decisions easier (Taylor 2021). Given this, the first responding police officers need to be aware of the various factors that affect their decisions in high-risk situations. In this study, the focus is on the human agent (patrolling police officers), who help to build shared situational awareness (Seppänen et al. 2013).

Research Context

The context for this research is the Swedish police. The Swedish police consist of one national police authority under which all police units—from municipal police to counter-terrorist units—are found. The Swedish police carry out around 1.4 million job interventions each year, and of those around 30 are situations in which police officers are required to discharge their service weapons. Even if the ratio between the use of firearms and all jobs assigned to the police is extremely low, there is a national ambition to further develop the tactical approach and methods applied by the Swedish police.

Swedish Police Tactics

Since 2004, there has been a continuous development of the Swedish Police tactics to increase the safety of police officers, counterparts, and third persons (Polishögskolan 2005, 2013). The Swedish police have five national tactical methods—resting upon the general tactical explanation model (GTEM)—for the most common interventions where the police interact with persons. The five national tactical methods are building clearing/search, vehicle stop (normal and high-risk), roadblock, reconnaissance/observation/securing, and search in terrain (Polishögskolan 2005, 2013). These are developed to provide a time frame to build awareness that enables the police to be aware of the situation and have an opportunity to make correct decisions. The basis for understanding and writing about what constitutes the GTEM has been the training material—POLKON—which is the Swedish police conflict management system (Polishögskolan 2013) and the National Basic Tactics (Polishögskolan 2005).

The General Tactical Explanation Model

GTEM consists of three parts: (1) the tactical risk and threat assessment, (2) the concept of control (human abilities and incapacities), and (3) the thought process. The goal of the three parts is that the police in intervention situations should gain control of the situation and be able to solve the situation legally and in the safest possible way for all parties involved. Conclusively, control in the situation is defined as “time and ability to respond appropriately.”

The Tactical Risk and Threat Assessment

To gain control and anticipate possible attacks, a realistic tactical risk and threat assessment is a prerequisite as well as identifying where an attack may come from. In the tactical risk and threat assessment as concept a set of sub-activities are included: identification the problem area, risk area, focus point, and threat assessment. There is a hierarchy; first, the problem area always contains one or more risk areas which are where an attack may come from; the focus point is a risk area from which an attack/acute threat has been initiated and which must be dealt with immediately. Accordingly, the police officer should be able to know what and where the risks are and focus on these while understanding the human abilities and incapacities demanded to decrease the number of risks that officers are required to deal with simultaneously.

The Concept of Control (Human Abilities and Incapacities)

To have control of the situation, police officers need to be aware of human abilities and incapacities; in GTEM this is called the concept of control. This concerns perception, definition, and reaction. In GTEM it is stated that it takes time—to perceive an attack, to react to it, define what type of attack it is, or if it is an attack at all—and then respond to it. When attacked, humans have a limited ability to perceive their surroundings. This is especially true if they feel that they are in a life-threatening situation. The police officer must also understand the attack—define whether it is an attack and what type of attack it is. After an attack, the police officer needs to react upon it. Simple reaction time is a measure of how quickly an individual can react to a certain stimulus. Previous studies have shown that the simple reaction time for a human is about 0.2 s—which means the time it takes after an individual has perceived something and physically reacting to it (Woods et al. 2015).

The Thought Process

The thought process is the third part of the GTEM. The risks are identified together in tactical risk and threat assessment. Then, based on the knowledge of human abilities and incapacities, it is possible to know whether the officer has control of the situation, i.e., is there enough time to perceive, define, and react to a possible attack? If the answer to that question is “No!” control can, according to the findings, be established through the thought process. This can be done by adding processes to what the counterpart needs to do before an attack and by removing processes that the police need to do. In this way, time is provided for personnel to respond appropriately.

Three Basic Tactical Principles

GTEM is based upon three basic tactical principles. First, keep the tactics defensive and, if possible, avoid duel-like confrontation. Second, ensure that you have a path of retreat; for example, do not pass unsearched areas. Third, deal with as few problems and risk areas simultaneously as possible. A police officer needs to be flexible as police officer may choose to deviate from any of the basic tactical principles. This should be a conscious choice, which means that the deviation provides increased control of the situation or that the situation requires increased risk-taking. The requirement for this risk-taking is that life and/or health are at risk. There are some success factors described in the GTEM training material for a confrontative action. First, surprise means that the police can intervene before the attacker has time to react, locate, and prepare to attack. Second, movement and speed are used as a way to make it difficult for the attacker. Third, the attacker can be distracted in various ways to make it more difficult to attack the police. Finally, psychological influence is mentioned in the training material as a factor that can cause an attacker to give up. This may mean that the police dominate the situation numerically and/or physically and verbally.

Research Method

This research consists of overlapping and sequential phases with a common qualitative methodological approach (Creswell 2013). We collected the primary data from interviews, supplemented by literature and documents. This research was conducted by two researchers, both of whom have backgrounds as sworn police officers and extensive experience in tactical interventions and work in high-risk environments. We have also served as instructors in weapons, tactics, and self-defense. Together, we have over thirty years of police experience.

Data Collection

To reach an understanding of how situation awareness is used for decision-making and action applied by Swedish in tactical interventions, interviews with 21 police officers from one of the seven police regions in Sweden were made. The police officer responsible for coordinating tactical educational efforts in the police region in the north of Sweden provided a list of 30 police officers. The officers were selected strategically, based on their position in the police organization. We were interested in experience where GTEM is applied so we could further analyze situational awareness, so we selected patrolling officers from one police district in the northern police region instead of a random sample of police officers. This is known as purposive sampling (Silverman 2010). All officers were individually invited to the study by email and encouraged to book a time for an interview. Twenty-one officers responded directly. After the interviews were completed, we established that no additional interviews were required for this part of the research. The interviews were conducted in spring and early summer of 2021. The 21 respondents had between 1 and 30 years of operational police work. All the interviews were carried out using zoom as a platform and both researchers were present during all 21 interviews.

The interviews were 60–90 min long and we used an interview guide for semi-structured interviews. After some more general questions about the respondent’s background, police experience, and educational background, we started the interview with a short film. This depicted a 25-s car chase where the respondents saw how a police car followed a covered van into an industrial property by crashing through a gate. The film ended when the van was stationary and could not drive further. The final scene is shown in Fig. 1. After the film ended, the respondents were asked to describe how they interpreted the situation, how they would act in this scenario, and why. This was the introduction to the rest of the interview where the focus was on tactical interventions, decisions, actions, and the eventual lack of action. We asked questions. For example, “How would you act?” “What are the tactical challenges?” and “What considerations would you make?” The questions we asked were open and we encouraged the respondents to use terms and concepts from the GTEM. The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim.

Fig. 1
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Final scene in the film used in interviews

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Analysis of the Collected Data

After the interviews, we made notes and discussed the interviews. After the interviews were transcribed, we conducted an overall reading. The transcribed interviews were later analyzed using Nvivo 12. We structured and analyzed the findings by using the GTEM as the basis. The interviews were coded and categorized in several steps. Initially, we marked each statement with a provisional code and linked this to an emerging category. Examples of such codes were “time” and “hamper preparation.” In a second step, we undertook an aggregated analysis. This revealed several codes about how the officers applied GTEM, so we merged these. We then analyzed how the police officers described their GTEM application activities and how those were directly related to situation awareness. We achieved this by re-analyzing the transcribed interviews and applying the structure of three levels of situation awareness developed by Endsley et al. (2003, p. 14). The structure was as follows: level 1, perception of the elements in the environment; level 2, comprehension of the current situation; level 3, projection of future status.

Findings

Risk and Problem Area

In the police officers’ accounts of the events surrounding the first seconds after the stop, the officers said they should focus on the side of the van where they were positioned, that is, the driver of the police car focused on the left part of the van, and the passenger of the police car focused on the right part of the van (Fig. 2). Another problem that occurred in the interviews was that the van was covered and thus it was impossible to see into the vehicle. The result of this was that the police could not know how many people were in the car, and interviewees said they were not aware of the risks when the vehicle stopped.

Fig. 2
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A picture of how the officers were located in relation to the van and where some of the officers decided to take up positions

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Threat Assessment

The officers discussed the difficulties of knowing what the threat was. They problematized the different scenarios that could come from the stationary vehicle. Some of them said that knowing more about the intentions of the driver of the chased car would enable them to know what the problem was, but often they did not know: “If I know… this car full of explosives… to drive it into a school… then you have some other problems. Or is it a lurcher (Kalle Kula) that has 5 g of hashish… So, it is difficult!” (Officer I).

The tactical risk and threat assessment involved knowing what to focus on and the lack of information that would enable them to know what they were intervening with—which included defining the (presumed) attack.

Time to Perceive, Define, and React

The officers wanted to have time to make the right decisions and to have control. Some—but not all—of the officers argued explicitly that it is important to be aware of human abilities and incapacities: “You have to define the threat before you can decide what to do and how to react” (Officer J). Others felt it was related to control: “It is time to perceive, define and act” (Officer A). Officer H believed that: “It’s an understanding of the basics (GTEM), that our brain needs time to sort things out in order to make its decisions.”

All officers said that the patrol car in the film was too close to the van when it stopped, and they related it to human abilities and incapacities and the concept of control, and that they would not have had time to manage an attack from the van. They would have had to take action to gain control. Officer Q said: “We got way too close… did not have control over the situation… no time to react, define, perceive if someone got out of the car and attacked… no distance, no time and ability.”

Make It Difficult to Be Located

Officer L said that an important advantage “is to use the high beam” and “light the stopped vehicle” to make it easier to see what was happening and make it difficult to be located, and some interviewees argued that they moved behind the patrol car, while others moved forward to the stationary vehicle to gain better control. Regardless of whether the officers moved forwards or backwards, they talked about using the darkness to their advantage. Further, Officer M argued: “If you stand in good protection or cover then they must find you to attack you.” Many of the officers argued in favor of getting out of the patrol car and creating a longer distance between themselves and the stationary vehicle. Officer N described how the police commanded the counterpart to stand: “…with their backs facing us so we have control.” Additionally, Officer P said: “They should not turn to me; it’s dark.”

Be Prepared

The officers discussed how to be prepared to act appropriately toward what they perceived and defined. For example, Officer N said: “It is not entirely unreasonable to have drawn the service weapon at that time, depending on other circumstances.” This is related the human abilities and incapacities, that is, it takes time to define a threat and Officer K said, “We must define the threat; we cannot just, okay, we see a person and we shoot; it does not work.” He described how he used the thought process to gain control:

It will be “them to us,” that you create time and opportunity. You want as high a level of preparedness as possible. I would probably draw my service weapon in this situation… to see what comes out of this car. But that is exactly it … to have time and to have time to define what is happening in there. (Officer K)

Further, the officers wanted to be prepared for what could happen during the intervention.

The officers described how they could act—depending on the circumstances—to be prepared for the evolving situation and not to be caught off guard.

Be Defensive to Gain Control but Use a Confrontative Tactic

All the interviewees said the patrol car was too close to the stationary vehicle. As described above, there were some suggestions that the best action was to decrease the distance to gain more time in relation to the people in the stationary vehicle and then try to command them to come to the police behind the patrol car outside of the problem area.

Officers in this study cited that a defensive approach would be a valuable way to gain control of the situation and intervene safely. However, some of them said they would act in a more confrontative manner. Officer A believed that “It’s the way you do it every day so everyone is expected to be able to do it” (a vehicle stop). He then went on to say: “…but as soon as something extraordinarily happens then the reptile brain is activated and we run forward, smash as many car windows as possible and push (force someone off the road) as much as we can. Maybe without reflecting so much on what the input values are.” Therefore, he believes that “It will probably be some kind of ‘thought trap’ in the form of wanting to start this control that if you pepper sprayed the driver and put him on the ground then you have control. But you may not have thought about what might happen on the way there.” He then reflected on why this was so: “Well, that’s how it is done. I do not know … that is probably what you have heard that your colleagues have done” (Officer A). Officer B said: “It’s obvious that we should not rush forward there but I think that’s what we should have done because we are not talking about this type of tactic.”

Officer C believed that utilizing a confrontative tactic, that is, “run forward, smash the car window, spray everyone with pepper spray, and then pull them out onto the ground” was the culture, in his former district. He said he knew that it was not the right way to gain control but he still took that course of action because many different people said it would be the way of doing it. However, he said: “Those who talk about it… I must say they may be a little more forward, resolute, want to take control through speed or surprise moments.” Some of the officers justified the choice of a confrontative tactic with the argument that the driver would not have had time to run away from the vehicle if the police were by the driver’s door very quickly. Their experience was: “If they have taken a car, they run away” (Officer F).

There were also other perspectives on why a confrontative tactic was utilized. Officer D said: “I feel spontaneous, that was like a normal intervention. All for the piece of sugar. And it’s really bad.” Officer C said, “…but I run …my impulse when I see this, it is that I want to run forward. In terms of education, what I have learned, experiences and so on, says that it is very stupid.” Similarly, Officer E said, “You get into hunting mode. But you want to get rid of that and bring in some security thinking.” Others said that they run forward to see and gain control. Officer F said: “It is difficult to have control if you do not know what to control…” and continued with, “When I run forward, I can quickly get control and see what it is.” Officer G said, “We want to get control. That is probably why we run so fast.”

Path of Retreat

Some of the officers talked about the importance of having a safe retreat, where there are no risks. Officer G said, “You do not leave an unsearched area, but it is also the path of retreat. If you knock on someone’s door, you line up in a certain way so that you can get out of there.” Officer C concurred, saying: “If you have run forward, people can also come out from behind and then you are an easy prey.” One officer explained why a free path of retreat is important and how this is related to distance and a defensive approach:

“… a free path of retreat. In a vehicle stop … 2–4 car lengths … if two people come out with automatic rifles, you would have to flee behind the (police) car and down into a ditch as fast as you could. But in this stop so … keep your distance and work defensively. It is the adrenaline that makes you want to come forward and hit the baton on the car window, but in this case, we do not know what is there. If there are some of our known drug-drunk drivers that we have stopped, we would want to get to them quickly if they have got stuck.” (Officer O)

Deal with Few Problems and Risk Areas Simultaneously

Some of the officers said explicitly that it was important to try to decrease the number of risk areas to gain control because they could not control several simultaneous attacks. It is possible to perceive that there is an attack but as soon as that attack is coming, the officer will lose their focus on the other risk areas. Officer D said: “If you had asked me 10 years ago then I would have run forward and opened the (driver’s) door… the problem is that I do not have control when I end up there.” Officer C described how the police take care of one risk area at a time by commanding the driver of the vehicle to “‘Turn off the ignition and bring the car key and come out one at a time’ … then arrest them behind the patrol car and put handcuffs on to gain control of them one by one.” Officer I described how they used the “them to us” tactic, utilizing a “structured search of the car and taking them out one by one.” Further, Officer O said: “I try to have this person (the counterpart) in the light and I’m (the police officer) in the dark … and I steer him or her by communicating … Pick them out one by one.” Officer J explained in more detail how they tried to minimize risk areas to gain better control: “Open the trunk, initially to reduce and remove risk areas so that I have fewer risk areas to keep track of.”

Flexibility

Flexibility concerns an officer’s conscious choice to deviate from any of the basic tactical principles. While some officers argued for being confrontative and rushing forward to the driver’s door without being aware of the human abilities and incapacities, others were more consciously aware of being flexible in their actions and that the situation could change very fast. Officer P said: “I’m not controlling the situation; I do not have the time and ability to act in a situation where I stand by the police car at this distance. I’m too close!” Officer P described how to be flexible and use success factors as “speed and surprise to take control of them, then take verbal control, and eventually physical control, of those inside the van”, and “I must do something to improve my own possibility to gain control … I must make these decisions in a split-second.” Further Office P said: “it is not good to be passive, but to be very active”, and argued: “It will be your assessment there in the situation”, and rhetorically asked: “What gives the best effect? … Is it to take the distance or is it to go on at once? It’s always a balance …I must understand why I make those decisions.” These quotations visualize how the four themes—tactical risk and threat assessment, human abilities and incapacities, the thought process, and basic tactical principles—work together in an ongoing circular process.

Discussion

In this study, we explore the relationship between police tactics and police officers’ work with situation awareness. We have studied situation awareness through the lens of the Swedish police general tactical explanation model. In the following section, we provide a deeper analysis of the findings and discuss tactical interventions in detail in relation to situation awareness.

The Police Officers’ Understanding of Situation Awareness During Tactical Interventions

Situation awareness is identified as a success factor for how tactical decisions are made, which helps the police to perform secure and legally correct interventions and decisions (Andersen and Gustafsberg 2016; Andersen et al. 2015; Huhta 2023; O’Hare and Beer 2020). There are three levels of situation awareness described by Endsley et al. (2003, p. 14): level 1, perception of the elements in the environment; level 2, comprehension of the current situation; level 3, projection of future status. The relationships between situation awareness, action, and tactical decisions are interconnected and dynamic, with each component influencing and being influenced by the others in complex ways. We tried to explore situation awareness in subsequent action and decision-making processes. The police officers in this study all described their approach to the tactical intervention that would be required following the short film—depicting a car chase—used in the interviews. Many of them asked for more information to better comprehend the situation. The film ended when the car stopped after colliding with an unidentified obstacle. This triggered the police officers’ discussion about what could transpire. Based upon the initial perception, comprehension, and projection of future status, the officers discussed various tactical solutions. Most of the police officers asked for more information. When none was available, they described how they would act at the scene of the stationary car, to obtain more information. One police officer, for example, described the use of either the car lights or carrying a torch to aid in information gathering. This information gathering can also be related to the themes that Huhta et al. (2023) identified to derive situation awareness during police work, e.g., profiling the suspect, surrounding environment and conditions, and dangerous objects.

Some police officers described that they would rush forward to the driver’s side of the van with the purpose of hindering the driver and preventing them from escaping. Some of the officers demonstrated lower situation awareness at level 1 with less comprehension of the situation than others that approached the van with a higher level of situation awareness. As police officer (P) said: “I’m not controlling the situation; I do not have the time and ability to act in a situation where I stand by the police car at this distance. I’m too close, so I must do something to improve my possibility to gain control.” This is an example of someone using all three levels of situation awareness, i.e., perception, comprehension, and projection of future status. The comment of getting too close to the van can be related to Huhta et al.’s (2023) themes dangerous object and distance/time law.

In situation awareness research, Endsley (2000, 2001) states that information is not a problem; the problem is selecting the right information from the huge amount of data; see Fig. 3. In this study, the problem was that the police officers needed to gather information very actively. This means that situation awareness can be viewed as an iterative process where information is needed for both perception and comprehension. The findings showed that many of the interviewed officers claimed that they actively wanted more information, even if there was none. The available information can be so limited that the police officer cannot even comprehend the situation. This is visualized in Fig. 4 and such a situation is common for patrolling police officers. That meant that sometimes the police officers needed to act with less information and thus limited situation awareness. If there is time, a request or active search for information can be done, sometimes resulting in a new perception. However, a new round of comprehension and a new projection of future status can occur. When the situation requires it, or when there is no time left, the decision about the action is made.

Fig. 3
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The difference between data produced and information needed (Endsley 2000, 2001)

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Fig. 4
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The differences between information needed and data produced

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In this study, when the police officers explained how they would act upon the information in the short film, they often referred to other situations they had experienced when they motivated their behavior. Many said that when they acted, new information was needed, and the process of understanding the situation started again. Very simply, we can argue that this is a cyclic action with one or many iterations. Some police officers explained that they would approach the van on the driver’s side with motivation either to dominate the driver or to gain more information. Regardless of why this action would be taken, it is a risk-taking behavior that the police officers should be aware of. An alternative way to gain more information is to approach the van on the passenger side, as described by Dysterheft Robb et al. (2013), who conclude that approaching a vehicle on the passenger side during a traffic stop is the safest option for officers. Endsley (2015) clearly states that the process of situation awareness is not linear. The action of police officers can be conducted at level 1 or level 3, after many iterations (see Fig. 5).

Fig. 5
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The cyclic action of situation awareness, information needs, and action

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Final Discussion

In this study, we observed that the interviewed police officers apply the tactical basic that has its roots in the GTEM at a general level. However, there is a tendency to act quickly and take confrontative action. The justification for this behavior is that without a quick response, the situation can escalate in an unwanted direction. In the GTEM, there is a basis for solving a situation where a confrontative and rapid reaction is one of many alternatives, but where a more defensive tactical approach is preferable. Likely, the primary reason why confrontative tactical interventions often end successfully is similar to the one that Blair and Martaindale (2013) present—the success is primarily attributable to a choice of non-violent resistance. In the analysis of how situation awareness can be observed in a tactical intervention, we found that there is a significant need for sufficient available information for police officers to comprehend the situation more correctly and think about alternative outcomes before deciding on action. Police officers need to create a situation where they have time to obtain more information, which will lead to efficient and effective actions. Distance from an object (in this study, the stationary van) and in most situations a more physical distanced approach can help to achieve that.

Implication for Practice and Limitations

Based upon this study and the application of situation awareness, we have found that time and distance are key components of success in tactical interventions. When there is the time, e.g., during the drive toward a mission, we recommend that the police officers try to gather as much information as possible and therefore also perceive and comprehend the situation as early as possible. Therefore, disturbing technologies in the police vehicle can negatively affect the situation awareness capacity, which also is supported by Zahabi and Kaber (2018).

The film used in this study as basis for the tactical discussions has limitations. For example, using a film includes reliance on respondents’ accuracy when they watched the film. In addition, qualitative interviews rely on respondents’ ability to recall specific details accurately and honestly about their thoughts, opinions, or behaviors. To know about what the police officers actually do, we should probably use observation. To further elaborate and scrutinize tactical interventions and situation awareness, a field study approach is needed.

The fact that both researchers previously worked in the field being studied poses a potential limitation in the interviews, as our professional backgrounds may introduce bias into the data collection process. To mitigate potential bias, we employed several strategies. First, we tried to establish rapport and build trust with the respondents, creating an environment where participants felt comfortable expressing their views openly and honestly. This involved emphasizing the confidentiality of responses and assuring participants that their input would be valued regardless of any potential differences in perspective. Second, we applied rigorous methodological procedures to ensure the credibility and reliability of the data. For example, we used an interview guide and open-ended questions to encourage the respondents to speak without the influence of us as interviewers. Additionally, we adopted a reflexive approach, regularly reflecting on our own biases and assumptions throughout the research process. By remaining aware of our professional backgrounds and potential influence, we consciously worked to minimize the impact of bias on interview interactions and data interpretation. Despite these efforts, it is challenging to eliminate bias, particularly given our seniority and influence in the field. Nevertheless, our expertise in the field can make it possible to ask questions and interpret the findings on a deeper level than a novel interviewer.

Conclusion

In this research, we have studied the Swedish police tactics and how the police tactics relate to the work with situation awareness. The Swedish police tactics rest upon GTEM. We conclude that if GTEM is applied during tactical interventions there are better possibilities to achieve situation awareness. The cyclic action for situation awareness in Fig. 5 visualizes how this can be seen. We can also conclude that the themes that Huhta et al. (2023) present are also found in GTEM. The GTEM can provide tools to fulfill situation awareness levels 1–3. The tactical risk and threat assessment can support the police officers to perceive elements in the environment, e.g., problem and risk areas. The concept of control can support the police officers to comprehend the situation, e.g., define an attack. The thought process can support the police officers in projecting the future status, for example, localizing the counterpart.