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Extended animal cognition

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Abstract

According to the extended cognition thesis, an agent’s cognitive system can sometimes include extracerebral components amongst its physical constituents. Here, we show that such a view of cognition has an unjustifiably anthropocentric focus, for it tends to depict cognitive extensions as a human-only affair. In contrast, we will argue that if human cognition extends, then the cognition of many non-human animals extends too, for many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies humans rely on. To substantiate this claim, we will proceed as follows. First (Sect. 1), we will introduce the extended cognition thesis, exposing its anthropocentric bias. Then, we will show that humans and many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies. To do so, we will discuss a variety of case studies, including “intrabodily” cognitive extensions such as the spinal cord (Sect. 2), the widespread reliance on epistemic actions to solve cognitive tasks (Sect. 3) and cases of animal cognitive offloading (Sect. 4). We’ll then allay some worries our claim might raise (Sect. 5) to then conclude the paper (Sect. 6).

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Notes

  1. It may also contribute to a morally problematic invisibilization of animals (on which see van den Brandeler, 2024).

  2. Even philosophers defending a very demanding, narrow and anthropocentric conception of cognition seem to accept that at least some animals are genuine cognitive systems (see, for instance, Adams, 2018).

  3. For a longer, more recent treatment of the immune system as a cognitive system, see Gough (2023b).

  4. Yet, as (Facchin et al., 2021) and (Boem et al., 2021) notice, they might still have important implications concerning the methodology and the conceptual toolbox of the mind sciences and biological sciences.

  5. They can however move the retinae of their anterior median eyes to selectively “bring into focus” various bits of the perceptual image they capture.

  6. Recall that, for the purpose of this paper, we are officially neutral on whether unicellular organisms qualify as cognizers or not.

  7. Of course, we don’t wish to claim that any prop can become a cognitive extension. For example, in order to be used as a cognitive extension, a prop must be deployable in a transparent manner; that is, in a way such that the deployment of the prop is swift, irreflexive and automatic, and the prop’s usage does not pose any problem taxing the agent’s cognitive resources (see Facchin, 2022b; Smart et al., 2022 for up-to-date analysis of transparency in EC).

  8. One could object that in at least some cases the “tropism-based” reading should be preferred. After all, aren’t mud wasps the go-to case of an animal whose behavior is orchestrated by cunningly arranged tropisms? Our answer is “yes, but actually no”. Yes: mud wasps are the go-to case of behavior guided by tropisms. Yet, that traditional description is grossly exaggerated and misrepresents their behavior, which is not nearly as rigid and “mechanical” as it is traditionally described (see Keijzer, 2001). So: actually no, we shouldn’t actually prefer the tropism based reading.

  9. Whether or not “first wave EC” actually makes such claims is a complex matter we won’t discuss here (see Clark, 1998, 2011 for discussion).

  10. Originally, Clark and Chalmers (1994) included a fourth condition concerning the previous conscious endorsement of the relevant information, but the status of this fourth criterion has always been contested, and it is typically expunged from the “trust and glue” criteria (e.g., Clark, 2008).

  11. Even if Beate Krickel might have recently changed her mind, see Krickel (2023).

  12. For the same reasons, we are not claiming that the cases examined in Sects. 2–4 are cases of cognitive processes because they are described as cognitive by the researchers reporting on them. We are claiming that the processes in such cases are cognitive because they are instances of paradigmatically cognitive processes.

  13. Here intended in the proper biological sense, inclusive of humans.

  14. On dissolving kinds see Ramsey (2021).

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Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Marco Viola and Sanja Sreckovic for having read and commented upon various early drafts of the manuscript. We also wish to thank the participants of the Rudolf Carnap Lectures in Bochum and the SINE conference in Pisa and Lucca for their stimulating questions. A special thank you to Wouter van Hooydonk for his suggestions concerning human exceptionalism. Thanks also to the two anonymous referees for their stimulating comments.

Funding

MF is currently founded by the FWO Grant “Towards a globally non-representational theory of the mind” (Grant number 1202824N). GL is founded by a Ph.D. Grant in Sustainable Development and Climate Change (SU4). This paper and related research have been conducted during and with the support of the Italian national inter-university PhD course in Sustainable Development and Climate change (www.phd-sdc.it).

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  1. Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Universiteit Antwerpen, Prinstraat 13, 2000, Antwerp, Belgium

    Marco Facchin

  2. Department of Human and Life Sciences, Istituto Universitario di Studi Superiori IUSS Pavia, Linguistics & Philosophy IUSS Center (L&PIC), Palazzo del Broletto, Piazza della Vittoria n. 15, 27100, Pavia, Italy

    Giulia Leonetti

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GL ideated the paper. MF structured the arguments and wrote the first draft. Both authors are equally responsible for the final version of the manuscript. Both authors agreed on the authorship order.

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Correspondence to Marco Facchin.

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Facchin, M., Leonetti, G. Extended animal cognition. Synthese 203, 138 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04579-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04579-y

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