In this paper I argue that both defence and criticism of the claim that humans act ‘under the guise of the good’ neglects the metaphysical roots of the theory. I begin with an overview of the theory and its modern commentators, with critics noting the apparent possibility of acting against the good, and supporters claiming that such actions are instances of error.

These debates reduce the ‘guise of the good’ to a claim about intention and moral action, and in so doing have become divorced from the theory's roots in classical and medieval philosophy. Aristotle and Aquinas’ ‘guise of the good’ is primarily a metaphysical claim resting on the equivalence between actuality and goodness, from which conclusions about moral action are derived. I show the reasoning behind their theory and how it forms the basis for the claims about intention and action at the centre of the modern debate. Finally, I argue that the absence of its original foundation is apparent in recent attacks on the ‘guise of the good’. It is unsurprising that modern action theory and ethics have not always been able to comfortably accommodate the ‘guise of the good’; they are only telling half of the story.

在本文中，我认为，对人类“以善为幌子”行动的主张的辩护和批评都忽略了该理论的形而上学根源。我首先概述了该理论及其现代评论家，批评者指出了违背善意的明显可能性，而支持者则声称此类行为是错误的实例。

这些辩论将“善的幌子”简化为关于意图和道德行为的主张，并且这样做已经脱离了该理论在古典和中世纪哲学中的根源。亚里士多德和阿奎那的“善的伪装”主要是一种形而上学的主张，建立在现实与善之间的等价之上，由此得出关于道德行为的结论。我展示了他们的理论背后的推理，以及它如何构成现代辩论中心关于意图和行动的主张的基础。最后，我认为，在最近对“善的幌子”的攻击中，其原始基础的缺失是显而易见的。毫不奇怪，现代行动理论和伦理学并不总是能够舒适地适应“善的幌子”。他们只讲了故事的一半。