Compatibility of network products is an important issue in markets for communication technology as well as hard- and software products. Empirical findings suggest that firms competing in these markets typically choose intermediate degrees of product compatibility. We present a strategic two-stage game of two firms deciding independently or commonly on the degree of product compatibility in the first stage and on prices in the second stage. Indeed, partial compatibility constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when coordination costs of standardization are high and the installed bases are low - conditions that typically characterize IT markets.

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网络产品的永久问题 为什么 IT 公司选择部分兼容

网络产品的兼容性是通信技术市场以及硬件和软件产品的一个重要问题。实证结果表明，在这些市场中竞争的公司通常会选择中等程度的产品兼容性。我们提出了两个公司在第一阶段独立或共同决定产品兼容性程度和第二阶段价格的战略双阶段博弈。事实上，当标准化的协调成本很高且安装基数很低时——部分兼容性构成了一个子博弈完美纳什均衡——这是 IT 市场的典型特征。