This text deals with the interpretation of where the meaningfulness of existence and our being in the world in Emmanuel Levinas’s conception originates in its contrast to the similar conception developed by phenomenology of appearing - which is represented by M. Heidegger and H. Maldiney. I want to show on what premises Levinas argues that the epiphany of sense can only emerge in the case of a continuous overcoming of the nonsense of appearing and thus of Being as such. Therefore, I intend to go through the steps of Levinas’ reasoning, which he never developed systematically, and explain why he can view Being as nonsensical and what this notion of nonsense could possibly mean in Levinas’s philosophy. As a result, I would like present an implicit argumentation behind Levinas’s well-known claim that the birth of sense must be of ethical origin and cannot arise through the process of appearing or Being alone.

这篇文章处理了对埃马纽埃尔·列维纳斯概念中存在的意义和我们在世界上存在的意义的解释，它与由出现的现象学发展的类似概念形成对比 - 以 M. Heidegger 和 H. Maldiney 为代表。我想表明列维纳斯论证的前提是什么，只有在不断克服出现的无意义，从而克服存在本身的情况下，感觉的顿悟才能出现。因此，我打算通过他从未系统地发展过的列维纳斯推理的步骤，并解释为什么他可以将存在视为荒谬的，以及这种荒谬的概念在列维纳斯的哲学中可能意味着什么。因此，