This article presents and discusses a prima facie counterexample to modus ponens. To appropriately theorize the case, I argue for conceptualizing the notions of logical consequence and logical commitment in “normative” terms, so that logical commitment does not attach to the premises of a spurious dominance argument—and, more generally, does not attach to unreasonable decision states, or to syntactically specified classes thereof. I also suggest that there is a logical motivation for the restriction to “well-formed” decision states that is characteristic of Savage-style logics of decision.

中文翻译：

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先决条件和决策逻辑

本文介绍并讨论了先天犯罪的表面证据反例。为了适当地对案例进行理论化，我主张用“规范”术语将逻辑后果和逻辑承诺的概念概念化，这样逻辑承诺就不会附加到虚假支配论证的前提上——而且，更一般地说，不会附加到不合理的决策状态，或语法指定的类。我还建议，限制“格式良好”的决策状态存在逻辑动机，这是 Savage 式决策逻辑的特征。