This paper examines the optimal monopoly regulation without transfer based on Basso, Figueroa and Vásquez (Rand J Econ 48(3):557–578, 2017), which compare the quantity-based and price-based instruments to regulate a monopoly that has better information concerning its market demand than the regulator. The optimal screening mechanisms, which offer multiple menus of contracts for the regulated firm to select, and pooling mechanisms, which only provide a uniform contract, are characterized for each instrument. Furthermore, the corresponding performances of the regulator’s social welfare are ranked. Results show that, with non-increasing marginal costs of the regulated firm, the screening price mechanism would strictly dominate the screening quantity mechanism. The pooling price mechanism is always preferred to the pooling quantity mechanism when the slope of marginal costs is negative or slightly positive. Otherwise, the pooling quantity mechanism may be superior depending on the relative magnitude of the slope of marginal costs and demand function.

本文基于 Basso、Figueroa 和 Vásquez (Rand J Econ 48(3):557–578, 2017) 研究了无转移的最优垄断监管，它们比较了基于数量和基于价格的工具来监管具有更好优势的垄断有关其市场需求的信息比监管机构。最佳筛选机制为受监管公司提供多个合同菜单供选择，而汇集机制仅提供统一合同，每个工具都有其特点。此外，对监管机构社会福利的相应绩效进行排名。结果表明，在受监管企业的边际成本不增加的情况下，筛选价格机制将严格支配筛选数量机制。当边际成本的斜率为负或略为正时，统筹价格机制总是优于统筹数量机制。否则，根据边际成本斜率和需求函数的相对大小，合并数量机制可能更优越。