In this paper, we analyze a transportation game first introduced by Fotakis, Gourvès, and Monnot in 2017, where players want to be transported to a common destination as quickly as possible and, to achieve this goal, they have to choose one of the available buses. We introduce a sequential version of this game and provide bounds for the Sequential Price of Stability and the Sequential Price of Anarchy in both metric and non-metric instances, considering three social cost functions: the total traveled distance by all buses, the maximum distance traveled by a bus, and the sum of the distances traveled by all players (a new social cost function that we introduce). Finally, we analyze the Price of Stability and the Price of Anarchy for this new function in simultaneous transportation games.

在本文中，我们分析了 Fotakis、Gourvès 和 Monnot 在 2017 年首次推出的一款交通游戏，其中玩家希望尽快被运送到一个共同的目的地，为了实现这一目标，他们必须选择一个可用的目的地公共汽车。我们引入了该游戏的序列版本，并为公制和非公制实例中的稳定性序列价格和无政府状态序列价格提供了界限，考虑了三个社会成本函数：所有公共汽车的总行驶距离、最大行驶距离乘公共汽车的距离，以及所有玩家行驶距离的总和（我们引入的新社会成本函数）。最后，我们分析了同步交通博弈中这一新功能的稳定代价和无政府状态代价。