A historically popular response to the liar paradox (“this sentence is false”) is to say that the liar sentence is meaningless (or semantically defective, or malfunctions, or…). Unfortunately, like all other supposed solutions to the liar, this approach faces a revenge challenge. Consider the revenge liar sentence, “this sentence is either meaningless or false”. If it is true, then it is either meaningless or false, so not true. And if it is not true, then it can’t be either meaningless or false, so it must be true. Either way, we are back in a paradox. This paper provides a detailed and exhaustive discussion of the options for responding to revenge on behalf of “meaningless” theories. Though I attempt to discuss all of the options fairly, I will ultimately opt for one specific response and discuss some of its challenges. Various technical and logical matters will be discussed throughout the paper, but my focus will be philosophical, throughout. My overall conclusion is that the “meaningless” strategy is at least as well off in the face of revenge as any other approach to the liar and related paradoxes.

历史上对说谎者悖论（“这句话是假的”）的流行反应是说说谎者的句子毫无意义（或语义上有缺陷，或故障，或……）。不幸的是，就像所有其他针对说谎者的假定解决方案一样，这种方法面临着报复的挑战。考虑复仇骗子的句子，“这句话要么毫无意义，要么是错误的”。如果它是真的，那么它要么毫无意义，要么是假的，所以不是真的。如果它不是真的，那么它就不可能是无意义的或假的，所以它一定是真的。不管怎样，我们又回到了一个悖论。本文针对“毫无意义”的理论对报复的选择进行了详细而详尽的讨论。尽管我试图公平地讨论所有选项，但我最终会选择一种特定的回应并讨论它的一些挑战。整篇论文将讨论各种技术和逻辑问题，但我的重点将是哲学。我的总体结论是，在面对报复时，“毫无意义”的策略至少与解决说谎者和相关悖论的任何其他方法一样好。