This paper studies the operations of a telemedicine service system consisting of independent hospitals [general hospital (GH) and telemedicine firm (TF)]. Through the healthcare alliance, the GH and the TF collaborate in capacity decisions and revenue sharing, and establish a green channel to refer patients. We adopt a two-stage game model to study a revenue sharing scheme of the telemedicine healthcare alliance. In the first-stage the game, the GH and the TF negotiate a revenue-sharing ratio to distribute the revenue of the referred patients. In the second stage game, given the profit-sharing ratio, GH makes capacity allocation decisions, and TF determines its own price to maximize its own revenue. Results show that the revenue sharing scheme can increase profits and promote collaboration between GH and TF. When a large number of mild patients arrive at the GH, the GH tends to participate in the alliance. For the TF, high prices do not always yield high profit under the comprehensive influence of the alliance.

本文研究了由独立医院[综合医院（GH）和远程医疗公司（TF）]组成的远程医疗服务系统的运营。通过医疗联盟，GH 和 TF 在容量决策和收入共享方面进行合作，并建立转诊患者的绿色通道。我们采用两阶段博弈模型来研究远程医疗保健联盟的收益分享方案。在博弈的第一阶段，GH和TF协商收入分成比例来分配转诊患者的收入。在第二阶段博弈中，给定利润分享比例，GH做出产能分配决策，TF确定自己的价格以最大化自己的收益。结果表明，收入共享方案可以增加利润并促进 GH 和 TF 之间的合作。当大量轻症患者到达GH时，GH倾向于参与联盟。对于TF来说，在联盟的综合影响下，高价格并不一定能带来高利润。