This paper presents a logic of preference and functional dependence (LPFD) and its hybrid extension (HLPFD), both of whose sound and strongly complete axiomatization are provided. The decidability of LPFD is also proved. The application of LPFD and HLPFD to modelling cooperative games in strategic form is explored. The resulted framework provides a unified view on Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality and the core. The philosophical relevance of these game-theoretical notions to discussions of collective agency is made explicit. Some key connections with other logics are also revealed, for example, the coalition logic, the logic of functional dependence and the logic of ceteris paribus preference.

本文提出了偏好和函数依赖逻辑（LPFD）及其混合扩展（HLPFD），两者都提供了健全且强完备的公理化。LPFD的可判定性也得到了证明。探索了 LPFD 和 HLPFD 在战略形式合作博弈建模中的应用。由此产生的框架提供了关于纳什均衡、帕累托最优性和核心的统一观点。这些博弈论概念与集体代理讨论的哲学相关性是明确的。还揭示了与其他逻辑的一些关键联系，例如联盟逻辑、函数依赖逻辑和其他条件不变偏好逻辑。