Due to the lack of medical examinations, in online health platforms (called online channels), a portion of users are unable to be diagnosed. Recently, many mobile health providers have started investing in offline clinics or hospitals (called offline channels) to offer further health services to these customers (i.e., the online–offline model). Providers need to determine the optimal investment and pricing strategies of online and offline channels to maximize profits. In this paper, we first analyze the optimal strategies of the provider in a monopoly case, and find that the properties of optimal online and offline decisions tend to be opposite due to the competitive nature of the two channels. Furthermore, we compare this with the case where the provider invests only in the online channel (i.e., the online-only model) in terms of profitability and show that if the value of the online health (or the offline health) is not high (high enough), then the provider should choose the online–offline model, otherwise she should adopt the online-only model. Finally, we investigate a case of an m-health platform competing with local clinics and find certain interesting insights. In particular, unlike the monopoly case, in the competition case, the platform should operate the offline channel when the sensitivity of patients to the online service quality is at a moderate level, and not otherwise.

由于缺乏体检，在网络健康平台（称为线上渠道）中，一部分用户无法得到诊断。最近，许多移动医疗提供商开始投资线下诊所或医院（称为线下渠道），为这些客户提供进一步的健康服务（即线上线下模式）。提供商需要确定线上和线下渠道的最优投资和定价策略，以实现利润最大化。在本文中，我们首先分析了垄断情况下提供商的最优策略，发现由于两个渠道的竞争性质，线上和线下最优决策的属性往往是相反的。此外，我们将其与提供商仅投资在线渠道（即纯在线模式）的盈利能力进行比较，并表明如果在线健康（或线下健康）的价值不高（足够高），那么提供商应该选择线上线下模式，否则她应该采用纯线上模式。最后，我们调查了一个移动医疗平台与当地诊所竞争的案例，并发现了一些有趣的见解。特别是，与垄断情况不同，在竞争情况下，平台应在患者对线上服务质量的敏感度处于中等水平时经营线下渠道，否则不经营。