This paper endogenizes pro-entrepreneurship policies in a model where voters choose the strength of these policies and entrepreneurs generate social returns which benefit the median voter. In the model, incumbent firms who are harmed by the greater competition that this policy promotes can push back in two ways: via corruption and persuasion. Specifically, they can bribe elected politicians to break their campaign promises; and they can allocate some of their rents to corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives that also benefit voters. The model predicts that corruption which weakens pro-entrepreneurship policy can be completely neutralized by a forward-looking median voter—without removing the incentive among incumbent firms to bribe politicians. In this way, endogenizing entrepreneurship policy can destroy any relationship between corruption and entrepreneurship. Corporate social responsibility initiatives modify this prediction, which provides a novel rationale for CSR that appears to be new to the literature as well.

本文将支持创业的政策内生于一个模型中，在该模型中，选民选择这些政策的强度，企业家产生有利于中位选民的社会回报。在该模型中，因该政策促进的更激烈竞争而受到损害的现有企业可以通过两种方式进行反击：腐败和说服。具体来说，他们可以贿赂民选政客，以违背他们的竞选承诺；他们可以将部分租金分配给企业社会责任（CSR）举措，这也有利于选民。该模型预测，具有前瞻性的中间选民可以完全消除削弱支持创业政策的腐败行为，而不会消除现有企业贿赂政客的动机。这样，内生化创业政策就可以破坏腐败与创业之间的任何关系。企业社会责任倡议修改了这一预测，为企业社会责任提供了一个新颖的理由，这对于文献来说似乎也是新的。