Enterprises play a vital role in emergency management, but few studies have considered the strategy choices behind such participation or the collaborative relationship with the government. This study contended that enterprises have at least three strategies regarding emergency management: non-participation, short-term participation, and long-term participation. We constructed a two-stage evolutionary game model to explore the behavioral evolution rules and evolutionary stability strategies of the government and enterprises, and employed numerical simulation to analyze how various factors influence the strategy selection of the government and enterprises. The results show that if and only if the utility value of participation is greater than 0, an enterprise will participate in emergency management. The evolutionary game then enters the second stage, during which system stability is affected by a synergistic relationship between participation cost, reputation benefit, and government subsidies, and by an incremental relationship between emergency management benefit, government subsidies, and emergency training cost. This study provides a new theoretical perspective for research on collaborative emergency management, and the results provide important references for promoting the performance of collaborative emergency management.

企业在应急管理中发挥着至关重要的作用，但很少有研究考虑企业参与背后的策略选择或与政府的协作关系。本研究认为，企业在应急管理方面至少有三种策略：不参与、短期参与和长期参与。我们构建了两阶段演化博弈模型来探索政府和企业的行为演化规律和演化稳定策略，并利用数值模拟分析了各种因素如何影响政府和企业的策略选择。研究结果表明，当且仅当参与效用值大于0时，企业才会参与应急管理。演化博弈进入第二阶段，系统稳定性受到参与成本、声誉收益和政府补贴之间的协同关系以及应急管理收益、政府补贴和应急培训成本之间的增量关系的影响。本研究为协同应急管理研究提供了新的理论视角，研究结果为提升协同应急管理绩效提供了重要参考。