Genuine revolutions often use violence not only against their enemies but also against their friends. This paper argues that using violence against the proponents of a revolution functions as a way to boost collective action. A weakest-link punishment against the revolutionaries contributing the least to the revolutionary cause can be a way to solve Tullock’s paradox of revolutions. Further implications are developed. First, we show that those benefiting the most from the revolution and facing the lowest cost of punishing will self-select into the group using punishment to boost contributions to the revolutionary cause. Second, we explain that weakest-link punishment can be over-provided when its provision is decentralized, in which case centralizing punishment may be an efficient response. We use the French Revolution as a case study to illustrate our theory. While the proximate cause of the Terror during the French Revolution was to avoid free-riding, its underlying cause may not have been the “blank-slate” mindset of the revolutionaries but the reactionary and inflexible nature of the Ancien Régime’s institutions.

真正的革命常常不仅对敌人而且对朋友使用暴力。本文认为，对革命支持者使用暴力可以作为促进集体行动的一种方式。对对革命事业贡献最小的革命者进行最薄弱环节的惩罚，可以成为解决塔洛克革命悖论的一种方式。进一步的影响得到了发展。首先，我们表明，那些从革命中受益最大且面临惩罚成本最低的人会自我选择进入利用惩罚来增加对革命事业的贡献的群体。其次，我们解释说，当惩罚措施分散时，最薄弱环节的惩罚可能会被过度提供，在这种情况下，集中惩罚可能是一种有效的应对措施。我们使用法国大革命作为案例研究来说明我们的理论。虽然法国大革命期间发生恐怖的直接原因是避免搭便车，但其根本原因可能不是革命者的“白板”心态，而是旧制度制度的反动和僵化本质。