This paper investigates the moral emotion of being socially, but non-agentially connected to a harm. I propose understanding the emotion of an affiliated onlooker as a species of regret called ‘social-regret’. Breaking from existing guilt- and shame-based accounts, I argue that social-regret can be a fitting, expressive, and revelatory reactive attitude that opens the way for deliberation over accountability for others’ harms. When we feel social-regret, our attention is directed towards the moral salience of our social relations and the expectations that undergird them, as well as possibilities for ameliorative action. I consider several existing accounts of affiliated onlookers’ emotions (including embarrassment, guilt, and shame), and I highlight the advantages of supplementing these with a regret-based account. Social-regret provides a novel way to understand negative, self-directed emotions in response to others’ harms as rational, expressive, and potentially reason-giving experiences.

中文翻译：

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责任感：对他人的伤害感到遗憾

本文研究了社会性但与伤害无关的道德情感。我建议将旁观者的情绪理解为一种称为“社会遗憾”的遗憾。与现有的基于内疚和羞耻的解释不同，我认为社会遗憾可以是一种合适的、表达性的、具有启发性的反应态度，为审议他人伤害的责任开辟了道路。当我们感到社会遗憾时，我们的注意力就会转向社会关系的道德显着性和支撑社会关系的期望，以及改善行动的可能性。我考虑了一些现有的有关旁观者情绪（包括尴尬、内疚和羞耻）的描述，并强调了用基于遗憾的描述来补充这些的优点。社交后悔提供了一种新颖的方式来理解消极的、自我导向的情绪，以回应他人的伤害，将其视为理性的、表达性的和潜在的理性体验。