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Tort Law and Contractualism Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2024-04-20 Peter Chau
How can tort law be justified? There are well-known difficulties with the three traditional theories of tort law dominating the literature (namely, economic theory, corrective justice theory, and civil recourse theory). Recently, some have turned to moral contractualism in search of tort law’s foundation. One of the most prominent attempts was made by Gregory Keating. Keating’s account, however, has
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Lawful, but not Really: The Dual Character of the Concept of Law Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2024-04-20 Brian Flanagan, Guilherme de Almeida
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Finding Leviathan in Hegel: The Private Rule of Law and its Limits Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2024-04-10 Paul Gowder
This paper uses Gerald Postema’s Law’s Rule to take up one of the most controversial questions in rule of law scholarship: whether the ideal can provide the basis for criticizing the state alone, or private individuals and entities exercising power over others as well. An account of the characteristics of states in virtue of which the rule of law licenses control over their power is developed, followed
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Why Metaphysics Matters: The Case of Property Law Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2024-04-09 Ben Ohavi
Are property rights absolute? This paper attempts to reframe this question by drawing on insights from the field of social ontology. My main claim is that, even if we accept the most extreme view of the absoluteness of property rights, there are some non-normative conceptual limitations to these rights. The conceptual limitations are based on two claims about the nature of property rights and their
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Public Ownership Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2024-02-12 Avihay Dorfman
The two questions I seek to address in these pages are what is public property and why does it matter. Public property, like property more generally, is a powerful legal arrangement of allocating control and use rights with respect to resources. Unlike private property, public property does not establish normative powers with which private individuals can shape their practical affairs in and around
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Paternalism at a Distance Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2024-02-06 Jonathan Turner
I argue that the distance between state and citizen gives state paternalism a pro tanto advantage over paternalism between individuals. Pace Jonathan Quong, the state neither denies nor diminishes my moral status by acting on a justified negative judgment about my rational or volitional capacities. Nor does its failure to paternalize on the basis of detailed information about individuals constitute
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Kotzen, Conditional Relevancy, and the Difficulties of Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2024-01-27 Ronald J. Allen
Forty years ago, Vaughn Ball demonstrated that the then received notion of conditional relevance served no useful purpose, as it would only come into effect if the probability of an element were 0.0. But, if the probability of an element were 0.0, a directed verdict would be in order and so once again conditional relevancy was doing no work. I extended that analysis to include the relationship between
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Exhortative Legal Influence Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-11-25 Crescente Molina
In this article, I offer a theoretical account of a central yet surprisingly overlooked form of legal influence or control, one that I refer to as the law’s ‘exhortative’ influence. The law exercises an ‘imperative’ influence when it purports to control agents’ behavior by imposing on them legal duties to act or refrain from acting in the legally desired or repelled way. By contrast, it exercises what
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Innate right, indeterminacy, and official discretion: A puzzle for Kantians Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-10-19 Paul Garofalo
This paper poses a puzzle for contemporary Kantian political philosophy. Kantian political philosophers hold that the state’s purpose is to secure the conditions for people’s innate right to equal freedom, while at the same time claiming that innate right does not give a determinate set of conditions that the state is to bring about. Officials, then, have to make decisions in cases where the considerations
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The Unilateral Authority Theory of Punishment Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-08-22 Richard Child
It is frequently argued that wrongdoers forfeit, through their wrongdoing, their previously held claim rights against being punished. But this is a mistake. Wrongdoers do not forfeit their claim rights against being punished when they violate rights. They forfeit their immunity to having their claim rights against being punished removed. The reason for this, I argue, is that when they violate rights
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THE CONTOURS OF CORPORATE MORAL AGENCY Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-07-08 Alan Strudler
This article defends skepticism about the moral agency of corporations, arguing that even if we accept the idea that there exist group moral agents, it makes little sense to suppose that the corporation itself can qualify as such an agent. The discussion considers and rejects arguments from Philip Pettit, Peter French, and Michael Bratman. It concludes that we should not criminally prosecute corporations
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Legal Positivism and Naturalistic Explanation of Action Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-07-05 Dan Priel
It is natural to think of legal positivism and jurisprudential naturalism as intellectually allied ideas. Legal positivism is associated with the idea that law is a matter of social fact; naturalism is a philosophical tenet that, among other things suggests the importance of scientific findings and methods to philosophy. At the very least, there seems to be a close family resemblance between the two
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Harmless Discrimination, Wrongs, and Rules Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-07-03 Anthony Sangiuliano
Discrimination is often tremendously harmful. But cases of harmless yet morally wrongful discrimination suggest that there are factors that make discrimination wrong other than its harmfulness. This article analyzes three views that resist this conclusion and poses some challenges for each. The first view appeals to unnoticed forms of harm in cases of harmless discrimination. But it counterintuitively
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Authority, Democracy, and Legislative Intent Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 Cosmin Vraciu
On one account, courts ought to enforce legislative intent only when the public meaning of the text of the statute is unclear, and on another account, they should enforce the intent even when the public meaning is clear. In this paper, I argue against both approaches. My argument rests on considerations related to the moral authority of the democratically made law. More specifically, I argue that those
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Ambiguous Sovereignty: Political Judgment and the Limits of Law in Kant’s Doctrine of Right Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 Tom Bailey
Kantian legalism is now the dominant scholarly interpretation of Kant and an important approach to legal and political philosophy in its own right. One notable feature is its construal of the relationship between law and politics decisively in law’s favour: Law subordinates politics. Political judgment is constrained by and only permissibly exercised through law. This paper opposes this subordination
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Stare Decisis and Equitable Power Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-06-03 Sebastian Lewis
One of the main moral costs of stare decisis lies in the continuous possibility of entrenching morally deficient decisions in the law. Although legal systems usually make provision for dealing with morally deficient precedents, there are cases in which the legal obligation of later courts to follow one of these precedents is undefeated. This possibility affects the overall justification of stare decisis
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What Legislation Is (Not): Comparing Legislation And Legal Rulings Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-05-10 Asif Hameed
We may sharpen our understanding of legislation by juxtaposing it with other types of legal act. John Gardner attempts to differentiate legislation from legal rulings – an unusual juxtaposition in itself – and his claims about the difference are surprising. Legal rulings are legally binding pronouncements issued by judges – eg ‘A owes B $50 in compensation’. The article queries the analysis advanced
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Ideology in the adjudication of the ECJ Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-05-09 Aristel Skrbic
This paper analyses the adjudicative methods of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) through the concept of ideology. In part one, I discuss Tamara Ćapeta’s application of Duncan Kennedy’s conception of ideology to the ECJ. I argue it has two shortcomings, both stemming from its account of ideology: treating ideology as pertaining primarily to individual beliefs rather than institutional practices,
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Metalinguistic Negotiation in Legal Speech Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-03-22 Bill Watson
This paper examines the role of metalinguistic negotiation in lawyers’ and judges’ speech about the law. A speaker engages in metalinguistic negotiation when the speaker uses a term to advocate for what that term should mean or how it should be used relative to context. While I doubt that legal practitioners employ metalinguistic negotiation in the ways that David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have proposed
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The Phenomenology and Ethics of P-Centricity in Mental Capacity Law Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-03-09 Camillia Kong
Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) in England and Wales, the liberal commitments to subjective freedom guide obligations towards persons who do not lack capacity. For the subject of proceedings who might lack capacity (P), it is less clear as to what obligations orient best interests decision-making on their behalf. The UK Supreme Court has emphasised the centrality of ‘P-centricity’ in best
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Why Busing Voters to the Polling Station is Paying People to Vote Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-01-24 Jørn Sønderholm, Jakob Thrane Mainz
In this paper, we argue that the widespread practice in the United States of busing voters to the polling station on Election Day is an instance of paying people to vote. We defend a definition of what it means to pay people to vote, and on this definition, busing voters to the polling station is an instance of paying people to vote. Paying people to vote is illegal according to United States federal
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Liability for Emissions without Laws or Political Institutions Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-01-19 Göran Duus-Otterström
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Are Parents Fiduciaries? Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-01-20 Scott Altman
Parents resemble trustees, conservators, and other fiduciaries; they exercise broad discretion while making choices for vulnerable people. Like other fiduciaries, parents can be tempted to neglect their duties or pursue self-interest at the expense of those they should protect. This article argues against treating parents as fiduciaries for three reasons. First, the scope of parental fiduciary duties
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Relational and Distributive Discrimination Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2023-01-20 Rona Dinur
Recent philosophical accounts of discrimination face challenges in accommodating robust intuitions about the particular way in which it is wrongful—most prominently, the intuition that discriminatory actions intrinsically violate equality irrespective of their contingent consequences. The paper suggests that we understand the normative structure of discrimination in a way that is different from the
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The moral permissibility of banishment Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-11-22 E. E. Sheng
This essay defends the moral permissibility, as a form of punishment, of banishment, namely the exclusion by a state of a citizen from its territory. I begin by outlining the prima facie case for banishment, consider for whom it may be appropriate, and acknowledge constraints on its permissibility. I then defend banishment against the main objections in the literature to banishment or the related measure
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Hart as an Inferentialist: The Methodological Pragmatist Insight in Hart’s Inaugural Lecture Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-11-17 Ziyu Liu
Jurisprudes today differ in their interpretations of H.L.A. Hart’s analysis of the semantics of internal legal statements. Drawing upon the philosophy of language and metaethics to reconstruct Hart’s view, they disagree as to whether Hart should be interpreted as an expressivist or quasi-expressivist. In this paper I propose a third reconstruction, under which Hart adopted an inferentialist analysis
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Critical Mercy in Criminal Law Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-11-14 Kristen Bell
Much contemporary discussion of mercy has focused on what I call ‘beneficent mercy’: compassionately sparing a person from harsh treatment that she deserves. Drawing on Seneca’s discussion of mercy, I articulate a different concept of mercy which I call ‘critical mercy’: treating a person justly when unjust social rules call for harsher treatment. Whereas beneficent mercy is grounded in recognition
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Now It’s Personal: From Me to Mine to Property Rights Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-11-14 David Shoemaker, Bas van der Vossen
Philosophical theories of property rights struggle to adequately explain the moral significance of ownership. We propose that the moral significance of property rights is due to the intersection of what we call "the extended self” and conventionally protected rights claims. The latter, drawing on conventionalist accounts of property rights, explains the social nature and flexibility of property. The
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Conditional Relevance and Conditional Admissibility Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-11-12 Matthew Kotzen
In this paper, I aim to explicate the distinction between ‘unconditional relevance’ and ‘conditional relevance’ as those terms and related concepts are applied in the context of admissibility determinations in modern trials. I take the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence to be my model in analyzing these concepts, though on my view any reasonable approach to legal evidence will have to distinguish between
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The Internal Point of View Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-11-09 Jeffrey Kaplan
The most discussed theory of law of the twentieth century – HLA Hart’s theory from The Concept of Law – is fundamentally psychological. It explains the existence of legal systems in terms of an attitude taken by legal officials: the internal point of view. Though much has been said about this attitude (what statements express it, what it is not, how Hart ought to have conceived of it, etc.), we nonetheless
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Response to Five Critics Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-10-25 Yitzhak Benbaji, Daniel Statman
In response to our critics, we explain why in spite of the ad bellum breach involved in the first use of force the war agreement is still binding; why the moral symmetry to which War by Agreement subscribes benefits all parties, weak and strong; why contractarianism leaves room the for moral option of not acting within one's rights and refusing to take part in a seemingly unjust war; why contractarianism
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‘De Minimis’ and the Structure of the Criminal Trial Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-09-28 R. A. Duff
The Model Penal Code’s ‘De Minimis’ provisions (§ 2.12) cover different kinds of case in which, for reasons of equity, a prosecution should be dismissed. An exploration of these different cases illuminates some general issues about the structure of the criminal process, and about the processes of criminalization. These include the significance of the difference between dismissing a case and acquitting
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Is there a duty not to compound injustice? Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-08-05 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
In a series of excellent, recent papers, Deborah Hellman expounds the intuitively appealing idea that we have a duty not to compound injustice. Roughly, one compounds injustice when facts that obtain as a result of prior injustice form part of one’s reason for imposing further disadvantages on the victims of this prior injustice. This article identifies several complexities and problems motivating
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Lesser-Evil Justifications: A Reply to Frowe Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-08-04 Kerah Gordon-Solmon, Theron Pummer
Sometimes one can prevent harm only by contravening rights. If the harm one can prevent is great enough, compared to the stringency of the opposing rights, then one has a lesser-evil justification to contravene the rights. Non-consequentialist orthodoxy holds that, most of the time, lesser-evil justifications add to agents’ permissible options without taking any away. Helen Frowe rejects this view
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Rights and Rules: Revisionism, Contractarianism, and the Laws of War Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-08-03 Linda Eggert
This paper defends revisionism against a challenge: that it cannot convincingly hold that many instances of killing in war are morally wrong but should nonetheless remain legally permissible. The paper argues that we should view the relationship between the morality of war and the laws of war as analogous to the relationship between fundamental principles and rules of regulation in debates about theories
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Disagreement by War Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-08-02 Arthur Ripstein
This review essay examines Benbaji and Statman's War by Agreement. It raises two challenges to their contractarian account of war, which seeks to show that considerations of mutual advantage can generate novel permissions. First, if such a robust justification for participation in unjust wars is available, it is not clear that any kind of agreement between states is even required; if a state can make
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Proportionality in the Liability to Compensate Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-07-30 Todd Karhu
There is widely thought to be a proportionality constraint on harming others in self-defense, such that an act of defensive force can be impermissible because the harm it would inflict on an attacker is too great relative to the harm to the victim it would prevent. But little attention has been given to whether a corresponding constraint exists in the ethics of compensation, and, if so, what the nature
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The Institutionalisation of the Basic Validity Rule Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-07-23 Miguel Garcia-Godinez
In a recent contribution to legal ontology, Kenneth Ehrenberg identifies a puzzle concerning the basic validity rule of legal systems: If formal institutions require a codified foundational constitutive rule, then legal systems cannot be formal institutions, since their foundational constitutive rule is necessarily an uncodified basic validity rule. To solve this puzzle, Ehrenberg suggests taking this
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Kinship, Justice, and Inheritance: The Case of ‘Rest’ in Ethiopia Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-07-15 Kebadu Mekonnen Gebremariam
This paper argues that the inheritance of wealth must be grounded on reasons other than the defense of the testator’s right to bequeath or that of an heir’s alleged moral right to receive inheritance. It asserts that the accepted approach in anglophone political philosophy about the justice of inheritance along the framework of ‘justice in transfer’ is misguided. Taking Rest land inheritance in Ethiopia
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Coercion Without Incapacitation Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-07-01 William R. Tadros
This essay examines why coerced conduct tends not to have the moral and legal consequences that non-coerced conduct often has. In it, I argue against the “incapacitation approach,” the view that coerced conduct tends not to result in the coercer acquiring a permission or an entitlement because the coercee is typically incapable of exercising her rights to change the coercer’s permissions or entitlements
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If You Care About a Rule, Why Weaken Its Enforcement Dimension? On a Tension in the War Convention Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-06-30 Susanne Burri
In War by Agreement (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), Yitzhak Benbaji and Daniel Statman argue that the ‘war convention’ – i.e. the international laws and conventions that are widely accepted to govern the use of force between sovereign states – represents a morally binding contract. On their understanding, the war convention replaces a pre-contractual morality governed by principles
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Religious Reasons in Politics: Some Problems for the Free Marketplace Model Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-06-22 Camilo Andres Garcia
In this paper, I critique a popular yet seldom recognized theory of the political role of religious reasons. According to this theory, the Free Marketplace model, laws may be justified on religious reasons as long as such laws do not impinge on rights. I argue that this theory is internally contradictory and can only be defended by either accepting normatively unacceptable consequences, or resorting
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Ethics, Force, and Power: On the Political Preconditions of Just War Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-06-20 Christopher J. Finlay
Benbaji and Statman’s contractarian ethics of war offers a powerful new philosophical defence of orthodox conclusions against revisionist criticism. I present a two-pronged argument in reply. First, contractarianism yields what I call ‘decent war theory,’ a theory in which war between decent states is paradigmatic. I argue, by contrast, that states should treat wars against indecent states as paradigmatic
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Stability, Autonomy, and the Foundations of Political Liberalism Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-04-19 Anthony Taylor
An attractive form of social stability is realized when the members of a well-ordered society give that society’s organizing principles their free and reflective endorsement. However, many political philosophers are skeptical that there is any requirement to show that their principles would engender this kind of stability. This skepticism is at the root of a number of objections to political liberalism
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‘But You Could Have Hurt Me!’: Risk and Harm Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-04-18 Joseph Bowen
This paper answers two questions. First, on the assumption that risk of harm is of moral significance, does risk’s moral significance lay in its being harmful? Second, is risk of harm itself harmful? I argue that either risk is not harmful or that risk is harmful only in a small range of cases. If risk is not harmful, and yet risk is of moral significance, risk’s moral significance cannot lie in its
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How Resilient is the War Contract? Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-03-25 Gerald Lang
In War By Agreement, Yitzhak Benbaji and Daniel Statman argue that the morality of war can be governed by a freely accepted agreement over the principles that apply to it. This war contract supersedes the application of the principles of everyday morality to war, thus defying ‘revisionist’ approaches to war, and it upholds a recognizable version of traditional just war theory. This article argues for
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On Normative Redundancies and Conflicts: A Material Approach Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-03-21 Federico Szczaranski
The challenges that normative redundancies and normative conflicts pose to legal theory have been traditionally addressed by either altering the rules that trigger them, or by including preference rules that deactivate them. As an alternative to these routes, this paper argues that the problems with both redundancies and conflicts only arise as a consequence of a mistaken understanding of legal reasoning
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Mala Prohibita, the Wrongfulness Constraint, and the Problem of Overcriminalization Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-03-05 Youngjae Lee
The wrongfulness constraint, as a principle of criminalization, is supposed to preclude criminalization in the absence of wrongfulness. Crimes that look especially problematic from the perspective of the wrongfulness constraint are mala prohibita offenses. The aim of this Essay is to consider the question whether the wrongfulness constraint can serve as an effective tool to curb overcriminalization
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On the State’s Exclusive Right to Punish Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-02-22 Gabriel S. Mendlow
In a characteristically iconoclastic essay, “Does the State Have a Monopoly to Punish Crime?”, Douglas Husak argues that the state’s moral right to punish crime is all but self-evident while its supposed monopoly on punishment is a fiction. Husak draws this bracing conclusion from a modest, quasi-Lockean premise – that persons and other entities have a right to impose stigmatizing deprivations on those
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What Makes a Home: A Reply Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-02-17 Christopher Essert
This is a reply to “What Makes a Home” by Kimberley Brownlee and David Jenkins. In it, I defend my own account of homelessness, which I call the ‘legal conception’ against their criticism and try to illustrate the differences between my view and theirs, which I call the ‘social conception.’
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Abetting a Crime: A New Approach Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-02-14 M. Beth Valentine
In “Abetting a Crime,” Husak puzzles over what, exactly, abettors are held liable for. Having (correctly) dismissed the proposal that derivative liability can ground the imposition of punishment, he then turns to fair labeling concerns to further highlight problems surrounding current Anglo-American complicity laws. The best moral solution, according to Husak, is a drastic but ultimately unworkable
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A Consequentialist Framework for Prevention Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-02-11 Sandra G. Mayson
Douglas Husak contends that both criminalization and punishment can serve preventive goals, so long as they respect retributive culpability constraints. This Essay draws on Husak’s work to argue that, while Husak is right to defend the legitimacy of criminal law as a (partly) preventive endeavor, preventive coercion is also permissible on consequentialist grounds alone, outside the culpability constraints
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Criminal Theory and Critical Theory: Husak in the Age of Abolition Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-01-28 Alice Ristroph
Political theorists imagine a world without government (“a state of nature”) in order to assess the legitimacy of existing states. Some thinkers, such as philosophical anarchists, conclude that in fact no state can be justified. Should theorists of criminal law similarly imagine away the very thing they seek to theorize? Doug Husak has claimed that “the object of criminal theory is to offer suggestions
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In Defense of Patient-Centered Theories of Deontology: A Response to Liao and Barry Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-01-24 Walen, Alec
S. Matthew Liao and Christian Barry argue that the patient-centered approach to deontology that I have developed—the restricting claims principle (RCP)—‘is beset with problems.’ They think that it cannot correctly handle cases in which a potential victim sits in the path of an agent doing what she needs to do for some greater good, or in which a person’s property is used to benefit others and harm
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What a Home Does Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-01-22 Jenkins, David, Brownlee, Kimberley
Analytic philosophy has largely neglected the topic of homelessness. The few notable exceptions, including work by Jeremy Waldron and Christopher Essert, focus on our interests in shelter, housing, and property rights, but ignore the key social functions that a home performs as a place in which we are welcomed, accepted, and respected. This paper identifies a ladder of home-related concepts which begins
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Accidentally Killing on Purpose: Transferred Malice and Missing Victims Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-01-17 Tomlin, Patrick
Transferred malice, or transferred intent, is the criminal doctrine that states that if D tries to kill A, and accidentally kills B, the intent to kill transfers from A to B, and so D is guilty of murdering B. This is widely viewed as a useful legal fiction. One of the finest essays on this topic was written by our honorand, Douglas N. Husak. Husak views both the potential usefulness of, and his preferred
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Are Tort Remedies ‘Civil Recourse’? Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-01-17 Smith, Stephen A.
In this article, I examine John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky’s argument, set out in Recognizing Wrongs, that the ‘principle of civil recourse’ explains much (though not all) of tort law. Specifically, I assess their claim that tort remedies are instances of civil recourse. I argue that while this label fits a variety of damages awards (and fits them better than the leading alternatives), it does
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On Blame and Punishment: Self-blame, Other-Blame, and Normative Negligence Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-01-15 Walen, Alec Douglas
Punishment should, at least normally, be reserved for blameworthy actions. But to make sense of that claim, we need an account of blame and of why it might license or even call for punishment. Doug Husak, in whose honor this paper is written, rejects quality of will theories of blame as relevant to criminal punishment – what I call ‘criminal blame’. He offers instead a reason-responsive account of
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Replies to Commentators Law Philos. (IF 0.526) Pub Date : 2022-01-10 Goldberg, John C. P., Zipursky, Benjamin C.
With gratitude for our commentators’ thoughtful and generous engagement with Recognizing Wrongs, we offer in this reply a thumbnail summary of their comments and responses to some of their most important questions and criticisms. In the spirit of friendly amendment, Tom Dougherty and Johann Frick suggest that a more satisfactory version of our theory would cast tort actions as a means of enforcing