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Reflective equilibrium in practice and model selection: a methodological proposal from a survey experiment on the theories of distributive justice Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-24 Akira Inoue, Kazumi Shimizu, Daisuke Udagawa, Yoshiki Wakamatsu
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On the gradability of knowledge how, and its relationship to motor representations and ability Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-24 Garry Young
In this paper I defend the traditional anti-intellectualist claim that a form of knowing how to Φ (e.g., knowing how to play the guitar) exists that entails the ability to Φ (play the guitar), and that this knowledge cannot be reduced to propositions (such as ‘S knows a way w to Φ’, where w is a means of Φing). I also argue that S can know how to Φ in the absence of the ability to Φ, and for this knowledge
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Bridgman and the normative independence of science: an individual physicist in the shadow of the bomb Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-24 Mahmoud Jalloh
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Extended animal cognition Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-23 Marco Facchin, Giulia Leonetti
According to the extended cognition thesis, an agent’s cognitive system can sometimes include extracerebral components amongst its physical constituents. Here, we show that such a view of cognition has an unjustifiably anthropocentric focus, for it tends to depict cognitive extensions as a human-only affair. In contrast, we will argue that if human cognition extends, then the cognition of many non-human
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‘I knew all along’: making sense of post-self-deception judgments Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-22 Martina Orlandi
Individuals deceive themselves about a wide variety of subjects. In fortunate circumstances, where those who manage to leave self-deception embrace reality, an interesting phenomenon occurs: the formerly self-deceived often confess to having ‘known [the truth] all along’. These post-self-deception judgments are not conceptually innocuous; if genuine, they call into question the core feature of prominent
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Anatomy’s role in mechanistic explanations of organism behaviour Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-22 Aliya R. Dewey
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Testimonial justification under epistemic conflict of interest Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-20 Philippe Colo
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Probabilistic epistemic logic based on neighborhood semantics Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-20 Yixin Pan, Meiyun Guo
In the literature, different frameworks of probabilistic epistemic logic have been proposed. Most of these frameworks define knowledge or belief by relational structure. In this paper, we explore the relationship between probability and belief, based on the Lockean thesis, and adopt neighborhood semantics that defines belief directly using probability. We provide a sound and weakly complete axiomatization
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Restricted nominalism about number and its problems Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Eric Snyder, Richard Samuels, Stewart Shapiro
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The metaphysics of puns Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-18 JTM Miller
In this paper, I aim to discuss what puns, metaphysically, are. I argue that the type-token view of words leads to an indeterminacy problem when we consider puns. I then outline an alternative account of puns, based on recent nominalist views of words, that does not suffer from this indeterminacy.
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Can episodic memory deter cheating and promote altruism? Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Nazim Keven
Episodic memory gives us the ability to mentally travel back in time to revisit and relive past experiences. In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the function of episodic memory. According to the orthodox view, episodic memory should be considered a part of a constructive system that simulates the future for sophisticated foresight and flexible planning. In this paper, I offer a
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Defending the pure causal-historical theory of reference fixing for natural kind terms Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Jaakko Tapio Reinikainen
According to the causal-historical theory of reference, natural kind terms refer in virtue of complicated causal relations the speakers have to their environment. A common objection to the theory is that purely causal relations are insufficient to fix reference in a determinate fashion. The so-called hybrid view holds that what is also needed for successful fixing are true descriptions associated in
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The Humean theory of motivation: much ado about nothing? Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Voin Milevski
According to the Humean theory of motivation, desire is identified as the primary source of motivation, while cognitive states like beliefs are recognized as necessary but not sufficient conditions. This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of the established teleological argument supporting the Humean theory of motivation. The analysis finds that recent anti-Humean strategies cannot conclusively
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Perceptual occlusion and the differentiation condition Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-17 Søren Overgaard
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How to lose your memory without losing your money: shifty epistemology and Dutch strategies Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-15 Darren Bradley
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Lagrangian possibilities Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-12 Quentin Ruyant, Alexandre Guay
Natural modalities are often analysed from an abstract point of view where they are associated with putative laws of nature. However, the way possibilities are represented in physics is more complex. Lagrangian mechanics, for instance, involves two different layers of modalities: kinematical and dynamical possibilities. This paper examines the status of these two layers, both in the classical and quantum
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Moving from the mental to the behavioral in the metaphysics of social institutions Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-11 Megan Henricks Stotts
One particularly influential strand of the contemporary philosophical literature on the metaphysics of social institutions has been the collective acceptance approach, most prominently advocated by John Searle and Raimo Tuomela. The continuing influence of the collective acceptance approach has resulted in alternative accounts that either preserve a role for collective acceptance, or replace it with
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Belief revision in psychotherapy Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-11 J. P. Grodniewicz
According to the cognitive model of psychopathology, maladaptive beliefs about oneself, others, and the world are the main factors contributing to the development and persistence of various forms of mental suffering. Therefore, the key therapeutic process of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT)—a therapeutic approach rooted in the cognitive model—is cognitive restructuring, i.e., a process of revision
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Bald-faced lying to institutions: deception or manipulation Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-10 Vladimir Krstić
Deceptionism about lying is the view that all lies are intended to deceive. This view sits uneasily with some cases that seem to involve lies not intended to deceive. We call these lies bald-faced because the liar lies while believing that the hearer knows that they are lying. The most recent deceptionist argument put forward by Rudnicki and Odrowąż-Sypniewska (this journal) defends the view that all
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Motivational pessimism and motivated cognition Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-10 Stephen Gadsby
I introduce and discuss an underappreciated form of motivated cognition: motivational pessimism, which involves the biasing of beliefs for the sake of self-motivation. I illustrate how motivational pessimism avoids explanatory issues that plague other (putative) forms of motivated cognition and discuss distinctions within the category, related to awareness, aetiology, and proximal goals.
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The playing field of empirical facts: on the interrelations between moral and empirical beliefs in reflective equilibrium Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-10 Manuel Cordes
What exactly is the role of empirical beliefs in moral reflective equilibrium (RE)? And if they have a part to play, can changes in our empirical beliefs effectuate changes in the moral principles we adopt? Conversely, can empirical beliefs be adjusted in light of certain moral convictions? While it is generally accepted that empirical background theory is of importance to the method of wide reflective
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The impoverishment problem Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-10 Amy Kind
Work in philosophy of mind often engages in descriptive phenomenology, i.e., in attempts to characterize the phenomenal character of our experience. Nagel’s famous discussion of what it’s like to be a bat demonstrates the difficulty of this enterprise (1974). But while Nagel located the difficulty in our absence of an objective vocabulary for describing experience, I argue that the problem runs deeper
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Memory-based modes of presentation Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-08 François Recanati
To deal with memory-based modes of presentation I propose a couple of revisions to the standard criterion of difference for modes of presentation attributed to Frege. First, we need to broaden the scope of the criterion so that not merely the thoughts of a given subject at a given time may or may not involve the same way of thinking of some object, but also the thoughts of a subject at different times
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Hyperintensionality and overfitting Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-08 Francesco Berto
A hyperintensional epistemic logic would take the contents which can be known or believed as more fine-grained than sets of possible worlds. I consider one objection to the idea: Williamson’s Objection from Overfitting. I propose a hyperintensional account of propositions as sets of worlds enriched with topics: what those propositions, and so the attitudes having them as contents, are about. I show
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Reliabilist epistemology meets bounded rationality Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-03 Giovanni Dusi
Epistemic reliabilism holds that a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a reliable or truth-conducive process. I argue that reliabilism offers an epistemology for bounded rationality. This latter concept refers to normative and descriptive accounts of real-world reasoning instead of some ideal reasoning. However, as initially formulated, reliabilism involves an absolute, context-independent
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Confidence in Covid-19 models Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-02
Abstract Epidemiological models of the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 played an important role in guiding the decisions of policy-makers during the pandemic. Such models provide output projections, in the form of time -series of infections, hospitalisations, and deaths, under various different parameter and scenario assumptions. In this paper I caution against handling these outputs uncritically: raw model-outputs
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Conspiracy theories, epistemic self-identity, and epistemic territory Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-01
Abstract This paper seeks to carve out a distinctive category of conspiracy theorist, and to explore the process of becoming a conspiracy theorist of this sort. Those on whom I focus claim their beliefs trace back to simply trusting their senses and experiences in a commonsensical way, citing what they take to be authoritative firsthand evidence or observations. Certain flat Earthers, anti-vaxxers
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Are thick aesthetic predicates assessment-sensitive? Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-01 Eleonora Orlando, Ramiro Caso
The aim of the paper is to evaluate the prospects for an aesthetically informed assessment-sensitive semantic account of thick aesthetic predicates (TAPs) such as 'intense', 'sombre', ‘balanced’, ‘harmonious’, etc. We distinguish two meaning dimensions concerning TAPs, truth-conditional and use-conditional or expressive, and provide a dualist semantics that posits assessment sensitivity at both levels
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The pragmatic turn in the scientific realism debate Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-29
Abstract In recent years there has been a noticeable yet largely unacknowledged ‘pragmatic turn’ in the scientific realism debate, inspired in part by van Fraassen’s work on ‘epistemic stances’. Features of this new approach include: an ascent to the meta-level (the focus is not so much on whether scientific realism is true, but on the prior questions of the nature of the positions in this debate,
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Conciliationism and the Peer-undermining Problem Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-29 Kevin Gausselin
This paper develops a problem for conciliationism that is structurally similar to the self-undermining problem but which is immune to most of the solutions offered against it. A popular objection to conciliationism is that it undermines itself. Given the current disagreement among philosophers about conciliationism, conciliationism seems to require rejecting conciliationism. Adam Elga (2010) has influentially
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Normal science: not uncritical or dogmatic Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-27
Abstract When Kuhn first published his Structure of Scientific Revolutions he was accused of promoting an “irrationalist” account of science. Although it has since been argued that this charge is unfair in one aspect or another, the early criticism still exerts an influence on our understanding of Kuhn. In particular, normal science is often characterized as dogmatic and uncritical, even by commentators
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Experiment-driven rationalism Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-27 Daniele Bruno Garancini
Philosophers debate about which logical system, if any, is the One True Logic. This involves a disagreement concerning the sufficient conditions that may single out the correct logic among various candidates. This paper discusses whether there are necessary conditions for the correct logic; that is, I discuss whether there are features such that if a logic is correct, then it has those features, although
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Processes as variable embodiments Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-20
Abstract In a number of papers, Kit Fine introduced a theory of embodiment which distinguishes between rigid and variable embodiments, and has been successfully applied to clarify the ontological nature of entities whose parts may or may not vary in time. In particular, he has applied this theory to describe a process such as the erosion of a cliff, which would be a variable embodiment whose manifestations
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Attitude ascriptions: a new old problem for Russell’s theory of descriptions Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-19
Abstract In order to explain that sentences containing empty definite descriptions are nevertheless true or false, Russell famously analyzes sentences of the form ‘The F is G’ as ‘There is exactly one F and it is G’. Against this it has been objected that Russell’s analysis provides the wrong truth-conditions when it comes to non-doxastic attitude ascriptions. For example, according to Heim, Kripke
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Distinctively generic explanations of physical facts Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-19
Abstract We argue that two well-known examples (strawberry distribution and Konigsberg bridges) generally considered genuine cases of distinctively mathematical explanation can also be understood as cases of distinctively generic explanation. The latter answer resemblance questions (e.g., why did neither person A nor B manage to cross all bridges) by appealing to ‘generic task laws’ instead of mathematical
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The Hole Argument without the notion of isomorphism Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-15 Joanna Luc
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Indexicals and communicative affordances Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-14 Adrian Briciu
Various data from communication that does not occur face-to-face are taken to be problematic for Kaplan’s account of indexical expressions, as is the case with the so-called answering machine paradox. One fix, developed by Sidelle (1991) and Briciu (2018), is the remote utterance view: recording artifacts are means by which speakers perform utterances at a distance, just as by means of other artifacts
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An idealised account of mechanistic computation Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-14 Luke Kersten
The mechanistic account of computation offers one promising and influential theory of computational implementation. The aim of this paper is to shore up its conceptual foundations by responding to several recent challenges. After outlining and responding to a recent proposal from Kuokkanen (Synthese 200:247, 2022a), I suggest that computational description should be conceptualised as a form of idealisation
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Inquiry, reasoning and the normativity of logic Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-13
Abstract According to the traditional view in the philosophy of logic facts of logic bear normative authority regarding how one ought to reason. Usually this is to mean that the relation of logical consequence between statements has some special relevance for how one’s beliefs should cohere. However, as I will argue in this article, this is just one way in which logic is normative for reasoning. For
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HOTT and heavy: higher-order thought theory and the theory-heavy approach to animal consciousness Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-13 Jacob Berger, Myrto Mylopoulos
According to what Birch (2022) calls the theory-heavy approach to investigating nonhuman-animal consciousness, we select one of the well-developed theories of consciousness currently debated within contemporary cognitive science and investigate whether animals exhibit the neural structures or cognitive abilities posited by that theory as sufficient for consciousness. Birch argues, however, that this
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Exploring, expounding & ersatzing: a three-level account of deep learning models in cognitive neuroscience Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-13
Abstract Deep learning (DL) is a statistical technique for pattern classification through which AI researchers train artificial neural networks containing multiple layers that process massive amounts of data. I present a three-level account of explanation that can be reasonably expected from DL models in cognitive neuroscience and that illustrates the explanatory dynamics within a future-biased research
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The consequence argument and ordinary human agency Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-13 E. J. Coffman
Brian Cutter (Analysis 77: 278-287, 2017) argues that one of the most prominent versions of the consequence argument—viz., Peter van Inwagen’s (An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press, 1983) ‘Third Formal Argument’—does not support an incompatibility thesis that every paradigmatic compatibilist would reject. Justin Capes (Thought 8: 50-56, 2019) concedes Cutter’s conclusion concerning van Inwagen’s
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Bolzano’s Tortoise and a loophole for Achilles Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-08 Yannic Kappes
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Functionalism, interventionism, and higher-order causation Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-06
Abstract It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism’s problems with mental causation disappear if we abandon the intuitive but naïve production-based conception of causation in favor of one based on counterfactual dependence and difference-making. In recent years, this response has been thoroughly developed and defended by James Woodward, who contends that Kim’s causal exclusion argument, widely
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Reference in remembering: towards a simulationist account Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-05 James Openshaw, Kourken Michaelian
Recent theories of remembering and of reference (or singular thought) have de-emphasised the role causation was thought to play in mid- to late-twentieth century theorising. According to postcausal theories of remembering, such as simulationism, instances of the psychofunctional kind remembering are not, in principle, dependent on appropriate causal chains running from some event(s) remembered to the
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What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience? Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-05 Johannes Kleiner, Tim Ludwig
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Rigor and formalization Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-04
Abstract This paper critically examines and evaluates Yacin Hamami’s reconstruction of the standard view of mathematical rigor. We will argue that the reconstruction offered by Hamami is premised on a strong and controversial epistemological thesis and a strong and controversial thesis in the philosophy of mind. Secondly, we will argue that Hamami’s reconstruction of the standard view robs it of its
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Precedent and rest stop convergence in reflective equilibrium Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-04 Bert Baumgaertner, Charles Lassiter
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Irreplaceable truth Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-02 Jamin Asay
Conceptual engineers are always on the lookout for concepts that can be improved upon or replaced. Kevin Scharp has argued that the concept truth is inconsistent, and that this inconsistency thwarts its ability to serve in philosophical and scientific explanatory projects, such as developing linguistic theories of meaning. In this paper I present Scharp’s view about what makes a concept inconsistent
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Consumer-side reference through promiscuous memory traces Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-02 Michael Barkasi
What fixes the referents of episodic memories? While developed theories are lacking, it is generally assumed that the causal production of a memory, via memory traces, determines its referent. Recently, it has been pointed out that the “promiscuity” of memory traces poses a problem for this approach. Proposed solutions focus on finding some nonpromiscuous causal link. In this paper, I refine the problem
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A note on Williamson’s Gettier cases in epistemic logic Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-29 James Simpson
In a recent series of papers, Timothy Williamson argues that one can reach Edmund Gettier’s conclusion that the justified-true-belief (JTB) theory of knowledge is insufficient for knowledge by constructing Gettier cases in the framework of epistemic logic. In this paper, I argue, however, that Williamson’s Gettier cases in the framework of epistemic logic crucially turn on an assumption that the JTB
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What is gullibility? Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-28 Yingying Zhao, Zhiqiang Hu
Reductionism about testimony has become less popular as philosophers have uncovered our epistemic dependence on others. Meanwhile, both non-reductionism and the interpersonal view face a challenge from gullibility. Surprisingly, the concept of gullibility has not been sustainedly examined. The primary goal in this paper is to propose an analysis of gullibility. After some introductory remarks, we begin
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Environmental epistemology Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-26 Dallas Amico-Korby, Maralee Harrell, David Danks
We argue that there is a large class of questions—specifically questions about how to epistemically evaluate environments—that currently available epistemic theories are not well-suited for answering, precisely because these questions are not about the epistemic state of particular agents or groups. For example, if we critique Facebook for being conducive to the spread of misinformation, then we are
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Is there a defensible conception of reflective equilibrium? Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-22 Claus Beisbart, Georg Brun
The goal of this paper is to re-assess reflective equilibrium (“RE”). We ask whether there is a conception of RE that can be defended against the various objections that have been raised against RE in the literature. To answer this question, we provide a systematic overview of the main objections, and for each objection, we investigate why it looks plausible, on what standard or expectation it is based
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Authenticity as self-discovery and interpretation of value Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-22 Sara Pope
This paper offers an alternate solution to the puzzle of transformative experience raised by Paul (2014), through an appeal to Arthur Schopenhauer’s concept of the acquired character, which speaks to the intuition that authenticity entails a notion of the ‘self-as-guide’ (Rivera et al., 2019). On Paul’s solution to the puzzle, transformative decisions may be made authentically by adopting a meta-preference
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Lying by explaining: an experimental study Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-22 Grzegorz Gaszczyk, Aleksandra Krogulska
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The teleological modal profile and subjunctive background of organic generation and growth Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-21 Preston Stovall